

*Foreign Policy Views of New
Jerseyans*

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


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Overview

American confidence in U.S. world leadership “fell to a 40-year low” in 2013 (Pew 2013) and has rebounded only slightly as serious questions about its leadership in the world, the effectiveness of its foreign policy strategies, and credibility of threats to the current world order and U.S. power remain. The 2016 U.S. presidential election has highlighted partisan and ideological divisions in foreign policy over trade (notably whether the U.S. should ratify the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)), the ongoing refugee crisis in Syria, the threat of ISIS and other terrorist networks, immigration policy, tension between Israelis and Palestinians, climate change, the rise of China, Brexit as a possible game changer for the U.S.-European Union (E.U.) alliance, and more. In 2017 and beyond, the next president will likely make decisions about all these issues.¹ Citizens’ attitudes about foreign policy issues are critical to understand as leaders’ decisions regarding these issues have a direct impact on people and organizations in states such as New Jersey.

In April 2016, a state-wide public opinion poll was conducted by the Stockton Polling Institute of the William J. Hughes Center for Public Policy (www.stockton.edu/hughescenter) at Stockton University. Live interviewers on the Stockton campus called both landlines and cell phones from March 31 to April 12, 2016. The poll was conducted with 802 adult residents of New Jersey. The poll's margin of error is +/- 3.5 percentage points at a 95 percent confidence level. MOE is higher for subsets. Data are weighted based on United States Census Bureau demographics for New Jersey.

This survey was based on national and international surveys distributed to the American public and experts in foreign affairs including policymakers and academics.² The foreign policy views highlighted in this report include the following:

- Position of the U.S. as a world leader
- Threats to the well-being of the U.S. including cyber security, North Korea’s nuclear program, and Russian authoritarianism
- Whether the U.S. should accept decisions made by the United Nations (U.N.)
- Effectiveness of military superiority, maintaining alliances, strengthening the U.N., and economic or military aid to achieve foreign policy goals
- Global climate change as a problem and possible solutions including the recent 2015 Paris Agreement and contributions of the U.S. and developing countries;
- Immigration
- Effect of trade agreements personally and on the economy;
- U.S. relationship with Cuba
- Confidence in monitoring compliance of Iran with its nuclear agreement;
- Strategies to combat terrorism abroad and specific options to defeat ISIS
- Policy for Syrian refugees

¹ Visit the following source for candidates’ views on foreign policy: Council on Foreign Relations. 2016. “Campaign 2016: The Candidates and the World.” <http://www.cfr.org/campaign2016/>.

² Complete results are presented in Appendix A with frequency distributions of demographic data, ideological views, and party affiliation included in Appendix B. Please refer to Appendix B when interpreting tables and figures. Responses in tables and figures may not add to 100% because of omission of “refuse/don’t know/other” responses. repon responses.

New Jersey and the World

Attitudes regarding the foreign policy issues highlighted here are also likely to remain constant for the 2017 New Jersey gubernatorial election. While many of the poll questions focus on issues that are of primary concern for the U.S. Executive Branch and U.S. Congress, New Jersey is uniquely situated as a state where the views of its population regarding foreign policy come from a place of greater interaction with the rest of the world compared to many other states. The State Department has multiple partnerships with public and private organizations in New Jersey and many New Jersey businesses have relationships in the rest of the world (U.S. Department of State 2016a). New Jersey also represents a significant portion of American trade and economic ties to the rest of the world; its imports accounted for 5.4% of total U.S. imports in 2015 (U.S. Census Bureau 2016a) and 2.1% of total U.S. exports in 2016 (Census 2016b). More importantly, 1.96 million people or 21.9 % of New Jersey's population is foreign-born (Census 2016c). Many people in the state participate in official exchanges for various State Department programs (e.g., Fulbright scholars) or serve as host communities for the 328 refugees settled in 2015 (U.S. Department of State 2016a) and others visiting the state from abroad. Furthermore as a coastal state, policies to mitigate effects from climate change are discussed and considered at the local, county, and state levels.³ There are 9 active U.S. military bases in New Jersey: 3 Army bases including Fort Dix that serves as a national deployment base, 1 Air Force base, 2 Coast Guard bases including the national training center in Cape May, and 2 Navy bases (Military Authority 2016); as of 2014, veterans represented 5.2 % of the state's adult population eligible for military service (U.S. Census Bureau 2016c). Therefore, national-level decisions about the foreign policy issues included in this poll are likely to have an effect on many New Jerseyans. For example, whether the U.S. ratifies the recently negotiated TransPacific Partnership (TPP) and how they negotiated specific provisions in the first place will have a direct impact on many workers and business owners in New Jersey who participate in importing/exporting. Decisions about the U.S. military in terms of deployments or continued spending will have an effect on New Jerseyans who are active military or civilians working on military bases or for organizations that support the multiple military bases and contractors in the state. Finally, New Jersey's economy and many norms, values, and expressions of its identity depend in part on our relationship with the rest of the world.

This report is organized as follows. First, a section on New Jersey and the world provides context for public opinion on many of these issues. Then, a summary of findings presents major results of this survey. For each section more detailed results are presented along with information about the foreign policy issues respondents were asked about, relying on research from academics, think tanks, and other sources. Then, differences in views based on party affiliation, ideology, gender, ethnicity and race, education, age, and income are presented with explanations from existing research and author opinion; not all differences are fully explained due to the lack of existing research and/or appropriate data in some instances. When available, the views New Jerseyans are compared to those held by the American public from national polls conducted by Pew Research Center, the Chicago Council, and other sources. Expert opinions are also compared for some questions using poll results from two distinct groups. The first expert group consists of members of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) who

³ Read more about the New Jersey Climate Adaption Alliance here: Rutgers University. 2016. "New Jersey Climate Adaption Alliance". Accessed May 15. <http://njadapt.rutgers.edu/>

participated in quadrennial joint polls with Pew Research Center dating back to 1993; views of 1,838 CFR members reported here are from a poll conducted in October-November 2013 with Princeton Survey Research Associates International (Pew December 2013)⁴. The second group of experts is a sample of international relations scholars comprised of 4,078 “individuals ... employed at a U.S. college or university in a political science department or professional school and teach or conduct research on issues that cross international borders” who participate in Teaching, Research, & International Policy (TRIP) Snap Polls (Maliniak, Daniel, Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers, and Michael J. Tierney 2014)⁵.

⁴ The joint Pew-CFR joint survey titled “America’s Place in the World” was most recently issued in December 2013. In April 2016, Pew released an updated “America’s Place in the World” with opinions from the American public only. Results from both reports are presented here, labeled appropriately with a) comparison group (either American public or CFR members) and b) date of poll (2013 or 2016).

⁵ The TRIP program and surveys are based at William & Mary’s Institute for the Theory & Practice of International Relations. Disclosure: the author is included in this sample and has participated in several TRIP polls. All TRIP survey results presented in this report are without personal bias.

Summary of Findings

The Role of the U.S. as a World Leader: A majority (53.2 %) of New Jerseyans think that the U.S. either retains its current position or has a more important and powerful role while a minority (44.5 %) view it as less important and powerful than 10 years ago. Within New Jersey, there is a deep partisan divide: a majority (65%) of Republicans and half (50%) of independents view the U.S. as less important while only a minority (25%) of Democrats feel the same. A generational divide exists, too: a minority (24.5 %) of millennials (people under the age of 30) and a majority (53.8 %) of baby boomers and older generations (people ages 65 and older) think that the U.S. plays a less important and powerful role.

Potential Threats to the Well-Being of the U.S.: An overwhelming or strong majority of New Jerseyans rank the following four trends as major threats to the well-being of the U.S.: ISIS (85.8%), Cyber attacks (77.6%), North Korea's nuclear program (71.5%), and Iran's nuclear program (68.1%) while a minority view the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians (41.9%) and growing authoritarianism in Russia (37%) as major threats. New Jerseyans are more concerned than experts about all of the possible threats identified in this survey. Within New Jersey, there is a partisan divide in which Republicans are more likely than Democrats to identify ISIS (+ 9.3 points) and the nuclear programs in Iran (+ 28.6 points) and North Korea (+14.6 points) as major threats. Independents are the most likely (at 83.7%) to identify cyber attacks while Democrats are least likely (at 30.7%) to identify authoritarianism in Russia as a major threat.

The Effectiveness of U.S. Foreign Policy Strategies (i.e., Statecraft): Most New Jerseyans favor maintaining military alliances (65.9%) and maintaining U.S. military superiority (59.9%) as very effective strategies while only a minority identify negotiating international treaties (46.3%), economic sanctions (31.7%), strengthening the U.N. (30%), and economic aid (24.7%) and military aid (23.9%) as very effective. A majority of Democrats (59.2%), however, also identify negotiating international treaties as very effective. More Republicans than Democrats favor maintaining military superiority (+15 points) while more Democrats favor negotiating international treaties (+20.5 points), strengthening the U.N. (+19.8 points), and economic aid (+17.1 points) as very effective strategies. An original content analysis reveals that New Jerseyans' partisan views on these strategies align quite closely with major party platforms for 2016. A gender gap is also observed in which women favor strengthening the United Nations (+12.2 points) and men view maintaining U.S. military superiority (+12.1 points) as more effective. A racial/ethnic division is observed, too. More blacks or African Americans in contrast to a minority of other groups identify negotiating international treaties (57.9%), economic aid (46.6%), and economic sanctions (39%) as very effective. More Hispanics favor strengthening the United Nations (41.2%) and are less likely to favor U.S. military superiority and economic sanctions. Ages 18-29 are more likely to favor strengthening the U.N., negotiating international treaties, and maintaining alliances while a strong majority of less educated (78.1%) favor military superiority.

U.N. Decisions: A plurality of New Jerseyans (49.7%) support rejecting U.N. decisions that the U.S. disagrees with. A majority of Democrats (56.4%) and younger people (60.2%) and a plurality of blacks (47.5%) and Hispanics (49.9%) say the U.S. should accept decisions of the

U.N. even when the U.S. disagrees while a majority of Republicans (67.7%), ages 65 or older (60.4%), and whites (51.3%) think the U.S. should reject U.N. decisions when it disagrees.

Importance of Allies: A slight majority of New Jerseyans (54.5%) think that the U.S. should consider its allies a good amount in making foreign policy decisions.

Climate Change: Aside from conservatives (20.8%), Republicans (22.2%), and high school graduates (47%), a majority of New Jerseyans (56.3%) say that climate change is a very serious problem, including slim majorities of men (54.1%), whites (54.1%), and independents (51.4%) and a strong majority of Democrats (86.7%), those from Asian or Pacific descent (84.8%), Hispanics (78.1%), far liberals (91.4%), and liberals (81.2%). In fact, the views of New Jerseyans are more closely aligned with Europeans than with national U.S. poll respondents on this and other climate change questions in this survey. New Jerseyans were also asked about the United States participating in the 2015 Paris Agreement from the December 2015 COP21 meeting; an overwhelming majority (75.8%) strongly or somewhat support U.S. participation in the Paris Agreement including a slight majority of Republicans (54%). New Jerseyans were also asked who should contribute more to reducing greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change – wealthy countries such as the U.S., Japan, and Germany that have released more greenhouse gases in the past, or poorer countries such as China or India that will be releasing more greenhouse gases in the future? A plurality of New Jerseyans (34.5%) say that developing countries should contribute more, departing from views of the rest of the world on this critical issue in effective climate change policy.

Undocumented Immigrants: In 2014, New Jersey was one of the top-five states for number of immigrants. A strong majority (76.8%) of New Jerseyans favor a path for them to stay if certain requirements are met, expressing a slightly more favorable view than all Americans. Of those in favor of a path for undocumented immigrants to stay, 54.4% want them to be able to apply for U.S. citizenship followed by 34.3% in favor of permanent residency.

Trade Agreements: A majority (58%) of New Jerseyans say that trade agreements have led to job losses while a plurality (26.6%) say they have probably hurt their personal or family financial situation and led to higher prices (33.1%). New Jerseyans have more negative views than all Americans and an original quantitative analysis reveals that manufacturing employment in New Jersey has been adversely impacted by increased trade with China, offering a possible explanation. Partisan divides are observed with Republicans more likely than Democrats to be pessimistic about trade agreements in all three of these areas. However, a majority (62%) of New Jerseyans say trade agreements are good for people in developing countries noting support for trade agreements as a development strategy.

The Rise of China: A majority of New Jerseyans are concerned about the rise of China: 70.5% say the large amount of debt held by China, 56.2% say the U.S. trade deficit with China, and 51.3% say China's military strength are very serious problems.

U.S. Relationship with Cuba: A majority of New Jerseyans favor establishing diplomatic relations (67.4%) and support ending the trade embargo with Cuba (65.5%), though they are less likely than all Americans to support both measures. A deep partisan divide reveals an

overwhelming majority of Democrats (91.6% and 86.2%) in contrast to a minority of Republicans (32.7% and 36.6%) support of both measures.

Options to Fight Terrorism: New Jerseyans agree with experts that sending U.S. trainers and special forces and blocking financing of suspected terrorists are always or mostly effective to fight terrorism. However, New Jerseyans depart sharply from experts on whether drone strikes, limiting flows of refugees, increasing border controls, and enhanced interrogation are effective with New Jerseyans lending much greater support. A partisan and gender gap is observed for enhanced interrogation with a majority of men (54.6%) and Republicans (74.5%) in contrast to a minority of women (41.9%) and Democrats (30.9%) identifying this as always or mostly effective; experts overwhelmingly agree this is rarely or never effective. Blacks are split with a plurality (36.8%) saying it is never effective, though 44.1% say it is sometimes or always effective.

Syrian Refugees: Views are mixed with more New Jerseyans (41.7%) saying not to accept any Syrian refugees into the U.S., compared to 36.4% who want to proceed with Obama's late-2015 plan to resettle 10,000 refugees without religious screening and 9.7% who want to resettle only Christians from Syria. There is a deep partisan divide on whether the U.S. should accept Syrian refugees with a strong majority (70.6%) of Republicans against accepting them and 62.5% of Democrats in favor of the plan to accept 10,000 refugees.

U.S. Ground Troops in Syria: A plurality of New Jerseyans (42.9%) oppose sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants in Iraq and Syria; a majority of Democrats (60.7%) oppose ground troops while a majority of Republicans (65.4%) support this option.


Efforts to Defeat ISIS: New Jerseyans assessed whether defeating ISIS is more likely if led by a) the United States; b) a coalition of Middle Eastern states; or c) NATO; a majority of 71.3% favor the U.S.-led option as likely to be successful. This is in contrast to experts who are more likely to favor a coalition of Middle Eastern states and NATO-led efforts.

The Role of the U.S. as a World Leader

While all Americans' views on the position of the U.S. as a world leader hit a 10-year low in 2013 with 53% viewing it as less important and powerful than 10 years ago (Pew 2013), that outlook has since improved. Today, a majority (53.2%) of

New Jerseyans think that the U.S. either retains its current position *or* has a more important and powerful role while a minority (44.5%) view it as less important and powerful.⁶ This is comparable to the views of all Americans, while a majority (62%) of Council on Foreign Relations members (Pew December 2013) say the U.S. has a less important and powerful role.

Public Less Confident than Experts in U.S. World Leadership Compared to Ten Years Ago



What does this mean? To be clear, normative (i.e., value-based) judgments behind responses to this question are unknown from this data. While one person might think declining American leadership in the world is “bad” for the U.S., another may think that a multi-polar world with power disbursed among three or more countries is good for the U.S. and the rest of the world. Furthermore, while many experts in international relations rely on evidence to point out that transitions of power among world leaders have typically been violent, others point to the changing context of today’s world system with more advanced structures and systems to peacefully resolve conflicts and transitions of power among countries as being distinct from the past.⁷ In other words, a transfer of power from the U.S. as a hegemon could be relatively peaceful, not characterized by violence akin to the shifts in global power that occurred after World War I and II. Power in today’s world is not restricted to military might (or hard power) but has been expanded to include soft power or the power to influence through “culture, ideology, and institutions” (Nye 1990, 181) or the structure of the global economy (Strange 1988). Experts may not necessarily view a shift in power away from the U.S. as bad for the U.S., either, particularly if the U.S. retains soft power in spite of perceived reductions in hard power.


⁶ Stockton Q1. Source: Pew Research Center (April 2016) Q.25 and Pew Research Center (December 2013) Q.8.

⁷ This is an exercise in applying a futurist perspective, predicting transitions of power in today’s world using a small number of cases from the past that were characterized by different structures. It is useful to think about the differences in structure in terms of whether there is a unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar world. If the U.S. has less power today, we are moving away from a unipolar world towards one that is either bipolar or multipolar where there is more than one sphere of influence. However, if the U.S. is more important or remains as important, we are likely to remain in a unipolar system where the U.S. is the primary sphere of influence even if that influence has declined since the Cold War.

Therefore, it is critical to avoid making assumptions that these views necessarily reflect what is “good” or “bad” for the U.S. or for the rest of the world. Experts in foreign affairs are likely to diverge from the American public in their assessment of the U.S. role in the world precisely because of differences in the normative assumption of whether it is “good” or “bad” for the U.S. to be a less powerful leader or more powerful leader and the depth of knowledge they have about the features of the current world system that would influence or hard or soft landing for a declining American hegemony.


Republicans see a Less Important and Powerful U.S. in the World Today

Aside from differences in expert opinions, there are deep divides in partisan views on the question of current American leadership in the world. A majority (65%) of Republicans and exactly half (50%) of independents view the U.S. as less important while only a minority (25%) of Democrats feel the same. In contrast, a strong majority (75%) of Democrats view the U.S. as about as important or more important and powerful a world leader today.⁸



Younger Generation more Optimistic about U.S. Leadership

There are also significant differences in views on global leadership across generations; a minority (24.5 %) of millennials (people under the age of 30) think that the U.S. plays a *less* powerful role in contrast to a majority (53.8 %) of baby boomers and older generations (people ages 65 and older).⁹ What explains this generational gap in confidence in U.S. leadership in the world? Those under 30 were born after 1986 and grew up in the post-Cold War era starting from 1989 thus generational gaps in views of American leadership in the world may arguably stem from the world systems that each age group experienced, among other factors. The post-Cold War era marked a major shift in the balance of world power and the end of the bipolar world system with power distributed among the U.S. and U.S.S.R., each with its own sphere of influence in the rest of the world. Fukuyama’s “The End of History and the Last Man” (1992) famously reflected a popular view at



⁸ Chi² = 104.3 (p<.000). To read more on why Republicans and Democrats might view the position of the U.S., and other things in this survey, in such different ways, refer to Hibbing, Smith, and Alford (2014; 2014) for their theory of physiology, genetics, biology, and partisanship.

⁹ Chi² = 50.853 (p<.000).

the time that the end of the Cold War was evidence of the dominance and superiority of western liberal democracy exemplified by the U.S. “We” had finally prevailed and the ideological clashes of the past were now over. This perspective also implied that authoritarianism (i.e., non-democratic policies or forms of governance) was no longer a legitimate threat to a new peaceful world order characterized by western liberal democratic values. However, critics immediately noted the following about this tenuous claim: “But one wonders how this “feel good” thesis is viewed in Asia, Africa and Latin America, where liberal democracies are often fragile at best and where basic human needs are not being met. Even in Western terms this provocative tract seems more attuned to the self-congratulatory 1980s than the problematic years ahead.” (Pierre 1992). In fact, in the 10-15 years that followed, we have witnessed rising powers in regions around the world previously assumed to be part of the third or developing world with many adopting autocratic approaches to politics and their economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and (later) South Africa (BRICs); Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa (CIVETS); Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) in East Asia from the 1960s through the early 1990s (e.g., Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan); Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs), and other individual and groupings of countries have dominated investment banks, development banks, regional and international organizations, with all those countries seeking a greater share of the global economy and greater influence in regional and global governance. The rise of China as a global economic and military power has also recently challenged American dominance. To summarize, public discourse about the rise of these and other countries and what that means for the balance of global power have become commonplace in the current post-Cold War era,

Potential Threats to the Well-Being of the U.S.

In assessing specific global trends that are threats to the well-being of the U.S., a majority of New Jerseyans view all of six trends they were asked about as either a major or minor threat to the well-being of the U.S.¹⁰ An overwhelming or strong majority of New Jerseyans rank the following four trends as major threats to the well-being of the U.S.: ISIS (85.8%), Cyber attacks (77.6%), North Korea’s nuclear program (71.5%), and Iran’s nuclear program (68.1%) while a minority view the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians (41.9%) and growing authoritarianism in Russia (37%) as major threats. A small minority rate the following as not a threat at all: ISIS (1.7%), Cyber attacks (3.3%), North Korea’s nuclear program (5.2%), Iran’s nuclear program (7.1%), Conflict between Israelis and Palestinians (12.1%), Growing authoritarianism in Russia (10.2%).

¹⁰ Stockton Q2-7. Source for questions: Source: Pew Research Center (April 2016) Q.34.b,d,e and Pew Research Center (December 2013) Q.6a-j.

Public More Concerned than Experts about Major Threats to the U.S.


Note that Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) members are consistently less likely to identify specific trends as threats to the well-being of the U.S. Where there is data to compare, fewer CFR members rank these as being

major threats; the exception is cyber attacks where there is no significant difference in their views versus those of all Americans or New Jerseyans. While the time lag between polling of CFR members in 2013 and this poll in 2016 may explain some of these differences, notable is the large gap between CFR members concerned about North Korea’s nuclear program (39%) as a major threat compared to all Americans (67%) and New Jerseyans (71.5%).¹¹ CFR

members clearly do not take the threat of North Korea as seriously as the public, a gap that may cause divisions in public opinion versus expert input on foreign policy strategies towards limiting North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and/or reach in their region and beyond.

| Major Threats to the U.S | New Jersey (Stockton 2016) | All Americans (Pew 2016) ¹ | CFR Members (Pew 2013) ¹ |
|---|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|
| The Islamic militant group in Iraq and Syria, known as ISIS | 85.8% | 80% (2016) | Islamic extremist groups like al Qaeda: 68% |
| Cyber attacks | 77.6% | 72% (2016) | 69% |
| North Korea’s Nuclear Program | 71.5% | 67% (2013) | 39% |
| Iran’s Nuclear Program | 68.1% | 68% (2013) | 56% |
| Conflict between Israelis and Palestinians | 41.9% | — | — |
| Growing authoritarianism in Russia | 37% | Tensions with Russia: 42% (2016) | 17% |

More Republicans Identify Trends as “Major Threats” to the U.S.



¹¹ Source for American and CFR: Pew Research Center (April 2016) Q.34.b,d,e and Pew Research Center (December 2013) Q.6a-j.


Republicans More Likely to Identify Major Threats.

While more New Jerseyans (77.6%) rank cyber attacks as a major threat in comparison to nuclear programs in Iran (68.1%) and North Korea (71.5%), the opposite is true for Republicans. More Republicans rank nuclear programs in Iran (87.7%) and North Korea (82.1%) as major threats compared to Democrats. Still, a majority of Democrats rank Iran’s nuclear program (59.1%) as a major threat while more rank North Korea (70.7%) as a major threat. A minority (41.1%) of Democrats compared to a slight majority (53%) of Republicans who identify the conflict between Israel and Palestine as a major threat and more Republicans (44%) compared to Democrats (30.7%) see growing authoritarianism in Russia as a major threat. The partisan divisions on threats to the U.S. aligns with views on the role of the U.S. in the world; Republicans are more likely to see the trends identified here as major threats to the well-being of the U.S. and are much more likely to see the U.S. as having a less important and powerful role in the world. Independents depart from Democrats and Republicans in identifying several of these trends as major threats to the well-being of the U.S. Cyber attacks are perceived as a major threat by more Independents (83.7%) than either Republicans or Democrat while a minority of Independents (35.3%) rank the conflict between Israel and Palestine as a major threat compared to either party, something that a majority of Republicans (53%) identify as such. Independents’ views on ISIS, Iran’s nuclear program, North Korea’s nuclear program, and growing authoritarianism in Russia fall either in between Democrats or Republicans or are statistically indistinguishable from the opinions of those affiliated with a major party.

On Statecraft: The Effectiveness of U.S. Foreign Policy Strategies

Seven foreign policy strategies were rated independently for how each is perceived by New Jerseyans in achieving the foreign policy goals of the United States – very effective, somewhat effective, not so effective or not effective at all.¹² These strategies aren’t necessarily mutually exclusive and therefore independent questions for individual strategies allows for interpretation of how a package of tools might be perceived by segments of the electorate as effective choices for policymakers. Together, this provides a comprehensive view of citizens’ perspectives on a variety of strategies that can be employed by an administration to achieve its foreign policy goals. Furthermore, an assessment of whether a set of specific strategies is effective provides a good proxy for the expected level of public support the same strategies as “one important influence [on public support for policies] is the instrumental value of a policy- that is, its effectiveness” and “a more effective policy is

New Jerseyans Identify Very Effective Foreign Policy Strategies




¹² Stockton Q8-14. Source for all questions but “Strengthening the U.N.”: Chicago Council (2015, 46); Source for “Strengthening the U.N.”: Pew (November 2013) Q7.d.

preferable to a less effective policy, all else being equal (McLean and Robyler 2016).¹³ Foreign policy strategies at the disposal of any country include a range of carrots (e.g., diplomacy) and sticks (e.g., sanctions, use of force). There are several considerations in assessing the use of foreign policy strategies. First is whether they work and, if so, to what ends (i.e., in achieving what goals). For example, a majority of researchers in the 1990s through today agree that sanctions generally do not work, citing success rates as low as 5% (Paper 1997) and as high as 34% (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990), though sanctions appear to be more successful when “success” is expanded to include their use as a threat when they aren’t actually implemented (Drezner 2003).¹⁴ Despite continued questions about their effectiveness, sanctions continue to be a popular foreign policy strategy under some conditions (Spaniel and Smith 2015). Another dimension to consider is that sanctions can be quite successful in appeasing a country’s own citizens. In other words, subjective evaluations by citizens about the effectiveness of specific strategies may matter more than expert evaluations, demonstrated by the example of sanctions (McLean and Robyler 2016, Voeten and Brewer 2006).

Republicans Favor Military Superiority while Democrats Favor Alliances

Overwhelmingly, more Democrats than Republicans favor *maintaining alliances* (+15 point difference), *negotiating international treaties* (+20.5 point difference), *strengthening the United Nations* (+19.8 point difference), providing *economic aid* to other countries (+22.5 point difference), and providing *military aid* (+7.2 point difference) as very effective strategies. In contrast, more Republicans than Democrats overwhelmingly evaluate *maintaining U.S. military superiority* (by +15 points) as very effective; this strategy was identified by the largest majority of Republicans (68.6%) as the single most effective strategy. Alternatively, the largest group of Democrats (77.1%) viewed *maintaining alliances* as the single most effective strategy.

Partisan Gap on Very Effective Foreign Policy Strategies



¹³ McLean and Robyler (2016) cite the following for this statement: Jentleson (1992); Larson (1996); Jentleson and Britton (1998); Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999); Eichenberg (2005); Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2006).

¹⁴ For more on the effectiveness of sanctions see Baldwin (2006) and Drezner (2003) for recent research and reviews of these and other papers from the 1990s: Drury (1998), Baldwin and Pape (1998), Elliot (1998), Pape (1997), Pape (1998), Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff (1997); Morgan and Schwebach 1997).

| Point Difference Across Party on Very Effective Strategies | | | | | |
|--|-----------|-------|-------|-------|--------------|
| | Overall % | Dem % | Rep % | Ind % | Dem-Rep diff |
| Maintaining alliances with other countries | 65.9% | 77.1% | 58.6% | 62.1% | +18.5% |
| Maintaining U.S. military superiority | 59.9% | 53.6% | 68.6% | 60.9% | -15% |
| Negotiating international treaties | 46.3% | 59.2% | 38.7% | 42.6% | +20.5% |
| Placing economic sanctions on other countries | 31.7% | 34.1% | 36.6% | 29.4% | na |
| Strengthening the United Nations | 30% | 40.6% | 20.8% | 25.6% | +19.8% |
| Providing economic aid to other countries | 24.7% | 34% | 16.9% | 22.5% | +17.1 |
| Providing military aid to other countries | 23.9% | 29% | 21.8% | 22.8% | +7.2% |

Views of the Public align with 2016 Party Platforms

The partisan divide on foreign policy strategies observed is also reflected in the rhetoric and party platforms from the 2016 presidential election. To test whether the views of New Jerseyans align with national party platforms, an original content analysis was conducted to identify explicit mentions of each foreign policy strategy in the Democratic and Republican 2016 party platforms recently approved at their respective national conventions in Cleveland and Philadelphia.¹⁵

Results from the content analysis identified in the table below suggest that the 2016 platforms align fairly well with public opinion, confirming a positive relationship between public opinion on effectiveness of foreign policy strategies and official party policies on said strategies.¹⁶ The two major parties are highly responsive to the perceptions and attitudes of their members or, alternatively, parties have successfully influenced public opinion; it is likely a combination of both. For example, 18.5% more Democrats favor *maintaining alliances* as an effective strategy and party platforms reflect this gap.

| Foreign Policy Strategies in Party Platforms | | | |
|---|--|---|---|
| Foreign Policy Strategy | Democratic Platform | GOP Platform | Difference in Public Opinion (Stockton) |
| Maintaining alliances with other countries | Yes | Yes but with limits | Favored by Democrats (+18.5%) |
| Maintaining U.S. military superiority | No mention | Yes | Favored by Republicans (+15%) |
| Negotiating international treaties | Yes | Yes and no; focuses on limits with explicit mention not to ratify several key treaties (see below for more) | Favored by Democrats (+20.5%) |
| Placing economic sanctions on other countries | Yes, for Iran (“if necessary”) and North Korea | Yes to Russia, No to lifting Iranian sanctions, No to lifting Cuban sanctions without specific conditions being met first | No significant difference |
| Strengthening the United Nations | Yes | No | Favored by Democrats (+19.8%) |
| Providing economic aid to other countries | Yes, without specific limits | Yes, with explicit limits or conditions | Favored by Democrats (+17.1%) |
| Providing military aid to other countries | No explicit mention of military aid | No explicit mention of military aid | Favored by Democrats (+7.2%) |

¹⁵ Sources: GOP (2016) and Democratic National Convention Committee (DNCC) (2016). Searches for each foreign policy were conducted using the following terms: allies and alliances, military superiority, treaties, sanctions, United Nations, aid or assistance (economic or military aid are not as commonly used as foreign aid or simply, aid).

¹⁶ Recall that U.S. citizens’ perspectives on foreign policy strategies and the effectiveness of said strategies may not be congruent.

Democrats (2016) stress that “we believe we should strengthen alliances, not weaken them” while Republicans (2016) are clear to note the limits of this strategy and “Avoid...unnecessary alliances”.

In regards to *maintaining U.S. military superiority*, there is no mention of this phrase or variations in the Democratic platform while Republicans explicitly identify U.S. military superiority as a “cornerstone” strategy with much more detailed proposals for what that means (e.g., “Reagan-era force that can fight and win 2 ½ wars ranging from counterterrorism to deterring major power aggressors”; explicit mentions of: defense system, modernizing nuclear weapons & delivery systems). Public opinion is also as divided; 15% more Republicans identify *military superiority* as a ‘very effective’ strategy.

Negotiating treaties is also treated differently in respective party platforms, corresponding with the divide in public opinion in which 20.5% more Democrats favor this strategy. Democrats note that they will “fulfill, honor, and strengthen to the highest extent possible...treaties” and criticize “abandon(ing) our treaty allies” while Republicans “oppose adoption or ratification of treaties that would weaken or encroach upon American sovereignty”. In regards to *strengthening the U.N.*, favored by 19.8% more Democrats, the parties divide sharply on this strategy in their platforms. Democrats explicitly call for ratification of the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) while Republicans explicitly reject the Convention on Women’s Rights (i.e., CEDAW), Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), and “various declarations”. All are awaiting ratification from Senate.¹⁷

¹⁷ The U.S. became a signatory to CEDAW July 17, 1980 and is one of only six countries who have not ratified or otherwise joined CEDAW including Iran, Nauru, Somalia, Sudan and Tonga (IMPOWR 2016); see Blanchfield (2011) and Koh (2002) for a comprehensive review of the debate over U.S. ratification. The U.S. became a signatory to CRPD on July 30, 2009; see Kayess and French (2008) and Megret (2008) for a review of this convention and Melish (2007) for the debate over U.S. ratification. The U.S. became a signatory to UNCRC on February 16, 1995; see also Forsythe (2000; 2012) for more on the U.S. and human rights in international relations. The U.S. signed the ATT in 2013; see Erickson (2015a; 2015b) for more on the U.S., arms trade, human rights, and the ATT. Source for dates: UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (2016). Note that U.N. conventions and other treaties do not need universal consent to enter into force and can therefore become binding international law without U.S. ratification.

Gender Gap on Effectiveness of Foreign Policy Strategies


Perhaps even more striking are gender differences in evaluating the effectiveness of foreign policy strategies. The observed gender gap in this poll reflect current research on the widening gender gap in foreign policy preferences in the U.S.; women are less likely to support use of force and military intervention, for example (Caughell 2016), and this difference has increased over time.¹⁸ Gender divisions are not perfectly congruent with partisan views, however. More women (36.2%) align with Democrats and away from men (24%) in favoring *strengthening the United Nations*. While overall everyone views maintaining

military superiority as more effective than *strengthening the United Nations*, more men (65.9%) than women (53.8%) view *maintaining U.S. military superiority* as more effective (a 12.1 point difference).

The largest majority of men (65.9%) view *U.S. military superiority* as the single most effective strategy, while the largest majority of all New Jerseyans (65.9%) identify *maintaining alliances* as very effective. Men’s support for *military superiority* as an effective strategy is also likely to be tied to their support for related policies such as continued military spending. However, the largest majority of both women and New Jerseyans on balance view *maintaining alliances* as very effective, instead.

This difference in views on *military superiority* also extends to *military aid*. Fewer women (21.2%) compared to men (26.5%) favor military aid as a very effective strategy. Recall that Democrats also make a distinction regarding these types of aid (i.e., economic and military) as very effective. However, for men there is no distinction between types of aid while more women (a +4.5 point difference) view economic aid as very effective compared to military aid.

Gender Gap on Very Effective Strategies



Point Differences for Gender Gap for Very Effective Strategies

| | Total % | Women | Men | Wom-Men diff |
|---|---------|-------|-------|--------------|
| Maintaining alliances with other countries | 65.9% | 65.1% | 66.8% | na |
| Maintaining U.S. military superiority | 59.9% | 53.8% | 65.9% | -12.1% |
| Negotiating international treaties | 46.3% | 46.3% | 46.5% | na |
| Placing economic sanctions on other countries | 31.7% | 31.7% | 31.8% | na |
| Strengthening the United Nations | 30% | 36.2% | 24.0% | +12.2% |
| Providing economic aid to other countries | 24.7% | 25.7% | 23.7% | na |
| Providing military aid to other countries | 23.9% | 21.2% | 26.5% | -5.3% |

¹⁸ See Caughell (2016) pp. 4-8 for a comprehensive review of the literature on the gender gap in policy preferences. See also chapters 2-3 for a review of literature on the widening gender gap in foreign policy preferences, in particular.

That more women than men favor a *strengthened U.N.* while more men than women favor *military superiority* should be interpreted in context of the notion that women are likely to make different decisions in international affairs if they held positions of political power. As of August 2015, only 22 % of representatives in legislative branches around the world were women, 21 women had served as Head of State or Head of Government, and in 37 countries, women made up less than 10% of representative in legislative branches while in 6 countries, there were zero women (UN Women 2016). Would female leaders employ different foreign policy strategies to achieve her country's goals? A more complex view takes into account the 'maleness' of the world system; that is, the idea that even if more women were in power, the world system is too steeped in male gender norms that are centered on security, military capability, and a general tendency to rely on military intervention as a viable strategy for her to behave differently than her male counterparts (Indira Gandhi and Margaret Thatcher are often cited as examples). This empirical question lies at the heart of gender in international affairs.¹⁹ Recently, though, research has demonstrated that the collective intelligence of groups that include a significant minority (i.e., more than 1 or 2) of women increases (Woolley, Chabris, Pentland, Hashmi, and Malone 2010; Engell, Woolley, Jing, Chabris, and Malone 2014).²⁰ Furthermore, groups with more women tend to make decisions that are more representative of the mean preference of the group and the broader population they represent; decisions of mixed gender groups skew towards this outcome when there are more women and away from it when there are more men (Hannagan and Larimer 2010). This, coupled with results here specific to gender preferences for specific foreign policy strategies, suggest the possibility of different foreign policy outcomes with women as heads of state but perhaps more importantly, as heads of agencies, ministries, and other groups working closely with a head of state to determine strategies in advancing the foreign policy goals of their state.

¹⁹ For a review of this question and more on gender and feminism in international relations, see Tickner (1992; 2001), Sjoberg and Tickner (2011), and Sjoberg (2009).

²⁰ These studies are profiled by the authors with audio interview and elsewhere here: Woolley, Anita and Thomas Malone. 2011. "Defend Your Research: What Makes a Team Smarter? More Women." Harvard Business Review, June 2011. Accessed May 15, 2016. <https://hbr.org/2011/06/defend-your-research-what-makes-a-team-smarter-more-women/ar/1>
Thompson, Derek. 2015.. "The Secret to Smart Groups: It's Women." The Atlantic Monthly. January 18, 2015. Accessed May 15, 2016. <http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/01/the-secret-to-smart-groups-isnt-smart-people/384625/>


Ethnic/Racial Divides on Foreign Policy Strategies

There are divides in views based on ethnicity/race. *U.S. military superiority* is viewed as very effective by a strong majority (61.4%) of whites compared to a smaller majority (54.5%) of blacks and a minority (47.0%) of Hispanics. In contrast, more Hispanics and blacks identify *strengthening the U.N.* and providing *economic aid* as very effective. More blacks, like women, favor *economic aid* compared to *military aid* as while Hispanics, whites, and the less educated do not make a distinction between *economic* or *military aid*.

Overall, substantively more blacks than any other group view *foreign aid* as an effective strategy. For the two different types of foreign aid, there is a +24.9 point and +20.6 difference between blacks and whites and a +15.5 point and +12.3 point difference between blacks and Hispanics. These differences in views regarding *foreign aid* along ethnic/racial lines can be interpreted in a variety of ways.

It may stem from variance in ideas about what U.S. foreign policy goals are in the first place; for example, if a survey respondent thought about advancing economic development as an important goal he or she may value foreign aid as a more effective strategy.²¹ Racial/ethnic divisions regarding the

Racial/Ethnic Divisions on Very Effective Strategies



Rankings of Very Effective Foreign Policy Strategies

| Blacks or African Americans | | Hispanics | | Whites | |
|-----------------------------|---|-----------|---|--------|---|
| 1. | Maintaining alliances with other countries | 1. | Maintaining alliances with other countries | 1. | Maintaining alliances with other countries |
| 2. | Negotiating international treaties | 2. | Maintaining U.S. military superiority | 2. | Maintaining U.S. military superiority |
| 3. | Maintaining U.S. military superiority | 3. | Negotiating international treaties | 3. | Negotiating international treaties |
| 4. | Providing economic aid to other countries | 4. | Strengthening the United Nations | 4. | Placing economic sanctions on other countries |
| 5. | Providing military aid to other countries | 5. | Providing economic aid to other countries | 5. | Strengthening the United Nations |
| 6. | Placing economic sanctions on other countries | 6. | Providing military aid to other countries | 6. | Providing economic aid to other countries |
| 7. | Strengthening the United Nations | 7. | Placing economic sanctions on other countries | 7. | Providing military aid to other countries |


²¹ It is known that policy goals are identified, defined, and measured differently across interest groups and other categories; see Stone (2002) for a review and theory of competing definitions of policy goals and how this shapes the outcome of specific policies.

effectiveness of foreign aid are also likely explained by differences in individual experiences with foreign or domestic aid (e.g., assistance through domestic programs intended for minority populations by design or in practice or benefits received while living in another country, if applicable). Recent research on attitudinal differences on foreign aid suggests that white attitudes may stem from paternalistic desires to help those not able to help themselves (i.e., people without agency or the capacity to improve their own lives) that are influenced by racial and regional characteristics of the aid recipient (e.g., white Americans were found to have this attitude towards black Africans) (Baker 2015).²² If paternalism drives attitudes of Western whites towards foreign aid, it is highly likely that other motivations apply to blacks and Hispanics. More blacks compared to other groups also view *economic sanctions* and *negotiating treaties* as very effective strategies. Sanctions can be part of a broader set of strategies that are linked to negotiating and complying with treaties, as sanctions can often be used as a tool to coerce compliance with existing treaties or to influence future cooperation through the codification of norms and rules in formal treaties. Still, a higher majority of blacks view *economic and military aid* than these strategies as very effective, further underscoring the deep racial/ethnic divide on foreign aid. Finally, more Hispanics (46.6%) compared to both blacks (34.1%) and whites (29.1%) view *strengthening the U.N.* as a very effective strategy. However, Hispanics are more likely to view this strategy as very effective compared to *economic or military foreign aid* and *economic sanctions*.

Generational Divides on Foreign Policy Strategies

More Generation Y (i.e., Millennials) and Generation Z (ages 18 to 29) than any other group with 44.6% view *strengthening the U.N.* as a very effective strategy. Compared to New Jerseyans overall, more of this younger age group also view *negotiating treaties* (+13.1 point difference), *maintaining alliances* (+7.4 point difference), and *economic aid* (+6.8 point difference) as very effective. In contrast, ages 65 and older, like Republicans and men, more strongly support *U.S. military superiority* (by a +17.1 point difference). Compared to the generation 65

Generational Gap on Very Effective Strategies



²² For more on paternalism in foreign aid, see William Easterly (2006) and Dambisa Moyo (2009). For a review of what makes foreign aid more effective and a ranking of donors, see Easterly and Williamson (2006). For a review on political and economic characteristics at the country-level that influence the amount of aid a country gives, see Milner and Tingley (2013), Milner and Tingley (2010), Tingley (2010); see Ahmed, Marcoux, Russell, and Tierney (2011) for how changes in aid allocations are explained by political and economic factors, namely crises.

and older, the younger generation more strongly supports a variety of multilateral approaches as very effective in contrast to the set of strategies emphasized as very effective by older generations.

Education and Foreign Policy Strategies


Notable divisions for educational include people without a high school degree overwhelmingly (78.1%) viewing *military superiority* as very effective in contrast to a slight majority (54.7%) of graduate degree holders.

Mixed Views on U.S. Reliance on Military Strength


When asked about whether the United States relies on military strength to achieve its foreign policy goals, people are split: 31.4% too little, 29.4% too much, and 35.3% about the right amount.²³ It is known that the public is more likely to favor foreign policy strategies that reduce harm to foreign civilians (McClellan and Robyler 2016), thus we see many New Jerseyans interpret non-military strategies as being very effective in the previous set of questions, though they are less likely than members of the Council of Foreign Relations (i.e., experts) to say that the U.S. relies too much on its military and instead, are much more likely to say the U.S. relies too little in comparison (Pew December 2013).

There are disagreements among New Jerseyans along partisan, generational, and ethnic/racial lines on this question. A majority (56.4%) of Republicans and a plurality of people ages 65 or older (39.7%) say that the U.S. relies on its military strength too little. Most others assess it as being used about the right amount while Democrats, younger people, blacks, and Hispanics are as likely to say it is used too much.

Education Gap on Very Effective Strategies




Reliance on Military Strength: Experts and Public



²³ Stockton Q37. Source: Pew (December 2013) Q.33.

A plurality of New Jerseyans Support Rejecting U.N. Decisions that the U.S. Disagrees With

A plurality of New Jerseyans (49.7%) think that the U.S. should reject decisions of the United Nations while 40.8% think that the U.S. should accept decisions of the United Nations even it when it disagrees with them; 9 % don't know or aren't sure.²⁴




decisions that it disagrees with while a majority (60.2%) of people ages 18 to 29 think the opposite. A majority of whites (51.3%) also say that the U.S. should reject U.N. decisions that it disagrees with while more blacks (47.5%) and Hispanics (49.9%) say that the U.S. should accept those decisions.

These sharp divides on views of the U.S. in the U.N. exists despite the high degree of formal influence the U.S. has through its permanent seat in the Security Council. In addition, the U.S. has informal influence in this and other international organizations through mechanisms that include locations of headquarters (New York, for the U.N.) (Stone 2013). It is also known that the U.S. has increased foreign aid to countries serving as non-permanent members on the Security Council, viewed as an additional attempt to exert influence (Kuziemko and Werker 2004). Despite these and other criticisms of U.S. power in the U.N., it is also the forum where


More Democrats, Young People, Blacks, and Hispanics say the U.S. Should Accept Decisions of the U.N.

A strong majority (67.7%) of Republicans think that the U.S. should reject decisions of the U.N. that it disagrees with while a majority of Democrats (56.4%) think that the U.S. should accept decisions of the U.N. that it disagrees with. There is also a clear generational gap on whether the U.S. should accept or reject decisions of the U.N.; a majority (60.4%) of people ages 65 or older think that the U.S. should reject U.N.

Partisan Divide on U.S. Accepting U.N. Decisions



Generational Gap in U.S. Accepting U.N. Decisions



²⁴ Stockton Q15. Source: Adapted from Pew Research Center (December 2013) PEW1.a.


developing countries and other blocs can successfully counter that influence through the General Assembly and other U.N. organs and agencies. Therefore, decisions made by some arms of the U.N. reflect a wider variety of preferences than others. Republicans see less value in agreeing with U.N. decisions when they don't align with U.S. interests, a notion expressed by specific mentions of the U.N. in their 2016 party platform identified in Table 4. On the other hand, Democrats value the U.N. even when it does not align with U.S. interests. There is a stark contrast in partisan views on the relationship of this primary international institution and the U.S.²⁵

Importance of Allies

Outside of the formal U.N. system, New Jerseyans were asked in deciding on its foreign policies, how much consideration should the United States give to the views of its allies.²⁶

Only 13.7% of New Jerseyans think the U.S. should consider allies only a little while a 54.5% think that the U.S. should consider its allies a good amount and 28.3% a great deal. In line with partisan consensus that *maintaining alliances* is viewed as a very effective strategy by most New Jerseyans, it is not surprising that a majority of both Republicans

(52.5%) and Democrats (56.7%) say the U.S. should consider its allies a good amount. Republicans have traditionally emphasized alliances, particularly for security, as a cornerstone of their foreign policy strategy while Democrats have struggled to find a common position and distinguish themselves from the Republicans on this point as they too emphasize alliances.



Climate Change

In assessing climate change as a threat, scientists contributing to the latest 2014 report issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) underscored the following for policymakers:

Human influence on the climate system is clear; warming [by 0.85 degrees Celsius from 1880 to 2012] of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia; the effects of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are extremely likely to have the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century; continued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long-lasting changes in all component of the climate system; the ocean will continue to warm and acidify, and global mean sea level to rise; Climate change will amplify existing risks and create new risks for natural and human systems. Risks are unevenly distributed and are

²⁵ Note that while decisions of the Security Council are binding and the U.S. has a veto in that body, General Assembly decisions are not binding. The U.S. has separate authority in various U.N. agencies such as the World Bank where it also enjoys a great degree of formal and informal power, arguably more so than in the primary organs of the U.N.

²⁶ Stockton Q16. Source: Pew Research Center (December 2013) PEW1.b.

generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all levels of development (IPCC 2014, 2, 4, 8, 10, 13).

There is a clear communication gap between scientists, media, policymakers, and the public that explain some of the divisions between the public and experts regarding the threat of climate change and therefore, appropriate policy responses. Scientists such as Dr. James Hansen (2012) have gone on record lamenting this disparity and lack of public attention while leaders of island nations such as Vanuatu have struggled to develop and implement disaster risk reduction policies in response to climate change (UN 2016). While the science on climate change is clear, attributing individual events to climate change is more complicated. For example, in citing reasons for the disappearance of five islands in the Solomon Islands, headlines were quick to blame climate change as the only cause and the scientists who authored the study quickly pointed out the error in the media, noting climate change as a “driving factor” along with trade winds and Pacific Decadal Oscillation (changes in climate akin to El Niño) as additional contributing factors.²⁷ Also useful in explaining differences in views on climate change is the “triple dilemma” (Goldstein and Pevehouse 2016), a framework that identifies additional reasons for opposing views:

1. “Short term costs to gain long term benefits”: there are clear and sometimes steep short term costs to make necessary adjustments to reduce greenhouse gases and implement other policy changes while the long term benefits are less clear and spread out over time.
2. “Specific constituencies such as oil companies and industrial workers pay the costs, whereas the benefits are distributed more generally across domestic society and intentionally”: this industry (and others) would face significant adjustments and losses while they would not necessarily gain the benefits, therefore are incentivized to lobby against changes that would impact them. Simultaneously, society more broadly has an interest in implementing changes to gain stated benefits.
3. “Benefits are shared globally but costs must be extracted from each state individually”: the current world system is setup such that global solutions to address climate change are based on agreements and treaties, therefore contributions to those solutions are negotiated and agreed on by countries;²⁸

Mitigation and Research Efforts in New Jersey

There are multiple efforts and initiatives in the state that address climate change, including the New Jersey Climate Adaption Alliance at Rutgers University²⁹, Climate Central in Princeton, NJ focused on researching the impacts of climate change including weather patterns and unique weather events³⁰, and Stockton’s own Sustainability Program³¹. These efforts may

²⁷ See the original article and follow-up, noting the error pointed out by the authors of the original study (Albert, Leon, Grinham, Church, Gibbes, and Woodroffe 2016):

Mathiesen, Karl. Headlines 'exaggerated' climate link to sinking of Pacific islands. The Guardian, May 10. Accessed June 1. <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/may/10/headlines-exaggerated-climate-link-to-sinking-of-pacific-islands>

Reuters. 2016. “Five Pacific islands lost to rising seas as climate change hits.” The Guardian, May 10. Accessed June 1. <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/may/10/five-pacific-islands-lost-rising-seas-climate-change>

²⁸ Quotes from Goldstein and Pevehouse (2016).

²⁹ Read more about the New Jersey Climate Adaption Alliance here: Rutgers University. 2016. “New Jersey Climate Adaption Alliance”. Accessed May 15. <http://njadapt.rutgers.edu/>

³⁰ Go here for more information: <http://www.climatecentral.org/>.

explain the departure of New Jerseyans from fellow Americans on their views on climate change


New Jerseyans Agree that Climate Change is a Very Serious Problem

Overall, a majority (56.3%) of New Jerseyans view climate change as a very serious problem with a minority of only 20% viewing it as not too serious or


not a problem at all.³² In comparing regional differences on this question, the views of New Jerseyans are more closely aligned with Europeans than all Americans and are 2.3 points above the global median of 54%.³³

Aside from conservatives with only 20.8%, Republicans with 22.2%, and high school graduates with 47%, a majority of everyone else says that it is a very serious problem, including slim majorities of men (54.1%), whites (54.1%), and independents (51.4%) and a strong majority of Democrats (86.7%), those from Asian or Pacific descent (84.8%), Hispanics (78.1%), far liberals (91.4%), and liberals (81.2%). The gender gap is 5% where more women than men see climate change as a very serious problem. Overall, conservatives, Republicans, whites, males, and less educated are less inclined to see climate change as a serious problem than everyone else.

Global Climate Change is...



Regional Differences on Climate Change as a Very Serious Problem (Pew 2015)



Strong Support for U.S. Participation in 2015 Paris Agreement

On the question of what to do about climate change, if anything, New Jerseyans were asked about the United States participating in the 2015 Paris Agreement that came out of the COP21 meeting.³⁴ The Paris Agreement set a goal to limit the rise of global temperature to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels over the next century, allowing individual countries to determine their own “nationally determined contributions (NDCs)”; the agreement does not

³¹ See the following article and interview with students and Patrick Hossay (coordinator for SUST) here: D’Amico, Diane. 2016. “What kind of job does a sustainability major get you?” Atlantic City Press, July 16. Accessed July 30. http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/education/what-kind-of-job-does-a-sustainability-major-get-you/article_66703618-4ac6-11e6-ba40-3b9c4a2c8721.html.

Go here for an interview with Stockton Sustainability majors: Damico, D. 2016. Stockton grads explain how they use their sustainability degrees” Atlantic City Press, July 17. Last modified August 7. http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/edition/news/stockton-grads-explain-how-they-use-their-sustainability-degrees/article_19d88922-9941-5c18-8587-f9f78689590e.html.

³² Stockton Q20. Source: Pew Research Center (November 2015) Q.32.

³³ Source for global data in text and chart: Pew Research Center (November 2015).


³⁴ Stockton Q21. Source: Adapted from Pew Research Center (2015b) Q.40. They were provided the following information: “the Paris 2015 international agreement to limit the release of greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change”.

enter into force until countries with a total of 55% of emissions have ratified the agreement (UNFCC 2015).


Median global support for “our country should limit greenhouse gas emissions as part of an international agreement” is 78% (Pew November 2015). A similar majority of 75.8% of New Jerseyans strongly or somewhat support U.S. participation in the Paris Agreement, which is higher than 69% of the American public (ibid). Again, New Jerseyans attitudes are more in line with the rest of the world compared to their fellow Americans.

As expected, in New Jersey there is a partisan divide with 74.7% Democrats in strongly support in contrast to 22.3% of Republicans. However, a majority of 54% Republicans either strongly or somewhat support U.S. participation.

U.S. Participation in the 2015 Paris Agreement




Partisan Divide on U.S. Participation in 2015 Paris Agreement



New Jerseyans Want Developing Countries to Contribute More while Rest of World wants Wealthy Countries to Contribute More

New Jerseyans were also asked who should contribute more to reducing greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change – wealthy countries such as the U.S., Japan, and Germany that have released more greenhouse gases in the past, or poorer countries such as China or India that will be releasing more greenhouse gases in the future?³⁵ All Americans depart from the rest of the world on this question with 40% saying that wealthy countries should “do more” compared to the global median of 54% (Pew November 2015). On whether developing countries should “do just as much”, 50% of all Americans agree while the global median is only 38% (ibid). A plurality of New Jerseyans (34.5%) say that developing countries should contribute more while fewer (31.9%) say “they should contribute the same”. So while the rest of the world favors a system where wealthy countries do more, people within those wealthy countries (i.e., the U.S.) think that developing countries should do just as much or more than wealthy countries. This speaks directly to the failure of the U.S. to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the reluctance of policymakers to commit the U.S. to more

Who should contribute more to reducing greenhouse emissions that contribute to climate change?



³⁵ Stockton Q22. Source: Adapted from Pew Research Center (2015b) Q.44.

reductions compared to other countries. Coupled with support for the Paris 2015 agreement, it also reflects a lack of public understanding of how the U.S. needs to adapt in order to meet targets set in that agreement. Underpinning this debate is the fact that global emissions is uneven:

Six largest emitting countries/regions in 2014 were: China (with 30%), the United States (15%), the European Union (EU-28) (9.6%), India (6.6%), the Russian Federation (5.0%) and Japan (3.6%). Remarkable trends were seen in the top three emitting countries/regions, which account for 54% of total global emissions. In China and the United States, emissions increased by ‘only’ 0.9%. The European Union saw a large decrease of 5.4% in 2014, compared to 2013, which offset the 7.8% growth in India. The Russian Federation and Japan saw their CO2 emissions decline by 1.5% and 2.6%, respectively (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 2014, 10)

The expired Kyoto Protocol relied on Annex I and non-Annex I countries to delineate individual commitments to meet the agreements goals. Under this “old” system of Annex I and non-Annex I countries³⁶, those who emit the most greenhouse gases (e.g., the U.S., China) had to implement more changes, thereby incurring more short terms costs while less developed countries argue that those countries who contributed the most greenhouse gases in the last 100+ years benefited immensely from doing so. Therefore, developing countries need greater access to technology and fewer restrictions on their emissions to have a chance to “catch up” to the wealthy and mitigate the “kicking away of the ladder” towards economic growth (Chang 2002). The Annex system essentially seeks to resolve the collective action problem stemming from the third point of the “triple dilemma” of climate change while also mitigating the problem of the lowest common denominator (Scott 2010), where countries least willing to make concessions shape an agreement in a way that reflects their own interests, thereby weakening its ability to effectively resolve a problem. It must be robust enough to serve a barrier for countries least willing to contribute, otherwise the long-term benefits from the Paris Agreement may be forgone. Given that the Paris Agreement makes no mention of Annex I or non-Annex I countries (C2ES 2016), there are questions about its ability to support its goals given the issues identified here. Though, transparency of countries’ commitments and progress, a mechanism for transfer of technology, and a floor for contributions to developing countries were included in recognition of the divisions between wealthy and developing countries (UNFCCC 2015).



Overall, New Jerseyans are more likely to side with Europeans than fellow Americans in assessing climate change as a very serious problem with the sharpest divides along party lines on climate change as a problem, U.S. participation in the agreement stemming from the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP21) in Paris, and contributions of wealthy countries like the U.S. Women and Hispanics are more likely to perceive climate change as greater threat and are much more likely than men or non-Hispanics to ask wealthy countries to pay more to reduce greenhouse gases. Lower income brackets also want wealthier countries to pay more to reduce greenhouse gases. On the other hand, whites are much less likely to

³⁶ The U.S. is an Annex I country; see the complete list of Annex I countries here: http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php and non-Annex I countries here: http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/non_annex_i/items/2833.php

perceive climate change as a serious problem, but more strongly support U.S. participation in the Paris COP21 2015 agreement.

Monitoring Iran’s Compliance with Multilateral Agreement on Nuclear Weapons

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached with Iran and the U.S., Britain, France, China, Russia and Germany includes provisions that allow Iran to continue its nuclear program for peaceful purposes in alignment with Article V of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), however skeptics point towards a lack of trust and confidence that slowing down their program will in fact limit their access to weapons.³⁷ New Jerseyans were asked about their confidence in the ability for the U.S. and international agencies (i.e., the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) to enforce JCPOA.³⁸ Views are mixed, though a plurality (41.2%) have some or a great deal of confidence while 33.4% have no confidence at all and 24.8% have not too much confidence.



As expected, there is a partisan divide with a majority (58.05%) of Republicans having no confidence at all while a stronger majority (69.33%) of Democrats have some or a great deal of confidence. This speaks to a larger partisan divide on confidence in international law, also expressed in the 2016 party platforms and contrasts in views of Republicans and Democrats in New Jersey on strengthening the U.N. as an effective strategy to achieve foreign policy goals. Critical factors in the effectiveness of international law include compliance and enforcement.


Undocumented Immigrants: Most New Jerseyans Favor a Path for them to Stay
 Immigration has become a central issue in the 2016 presidential election, particularly undocumented immigration. Currently, there are a total of 42.4 million immigrants in the U.S representing 13.3% of its population (Migration Policy 2016a). In comparison, New Jersey

³⁷ Access the full text here: Washington Post. 2016. “Full Text of the Iran Nuclear Deal.” Accessed May 15. <http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/1651/>


³⁸ Stockton Q24. Source: Adapted from Pew Research Center (2015c) Q.38. The following information was provided: as you may know, the United States and other countries have announced a deal to lift economic sanctions against Iran in exchange for Iran agreeing not to produce nuclear weapons.

has 1.96 million immigrants, 21.9 % of its total population, and within that group, 54.4% are naturalized U.S. citizens (U.S. Census Bureau 2016c). This is a higher percentage than the national average and in 2014, New Jersey was one of the top-five states for number of immigrants with a total of 2 million compared to 10.5 million in the #1 state of California (Migration Policy 2016a). Between 2000-2014, New Jersey was a top five state for its increase in the number of immigrants, though it was not in the top-five based on percentage increase (ibid).³⁹ New Jersey is estimated to have an unauthorized immigrant population of 550,000 compared to the 11.02 million unauthorized estimated to be in the U.S. (Migration Policy Institute 2016b).⁴⁰

Which comes closer to your view about how to handle undocumented immigrants who are now living in the United States:



Immigrants who are in the U.S. illegally and meet the requirements should be allowed to:



New Jerseyans express slightly more favorable views than all Americans towards immigrants being allowed to stay in the U.S., if certain requirements are met.⁴¹ A strong majority of 76.8% of New Jerseyans say there should be a way for undocumented immigrants to stay legally, in certain requirements are met; 72% of Americans agree with this statement (Pew Research Center August 2015). While there are partisan, ethnic/racial, and other differences in views on immigration, across every category except “very conservative” (n = 17), a majority of all New Jerseyans say that there should be a way for undocumented immigrants to stay legally, if certain requirements are met. Of those in favor of a path for undocumented immigrants to stay, 54.4% say they want then to be able to apply for U.S. citizenship while only 42% of Americans say the same (ibid). More Jerseyans (34.3%) than all Americans (26%) are also for permanent residency (ibid).⁴²

³⁹ See a comparison of this and more immigration data for New Jersey other states here: Migration Policy. 2016c. “State Immigration Data Profiles: New Jersey”. Accessed May 15. <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/state-profiles/state/demographics/NJ/US/>.

⁴⁰ See more on the unauthorized population here including work and insurance status, income, education: Migration Policy. 2016d. “Profile of the Unauthorized Population: New Jersey” Accessed May 15. <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/unauthorized-immigrant-population/state/NJ/>.

⁴¹ Stockton Q25. Source: Pew Research Center (August 2015); see same source for poll of Americans cited here.

⁴² Stockton Q25A. Source for question: Pew Research Center (August 2015). For more on what explains differences in attitudes towards immigration, see O’Rourke and Sinnot (2006).

New Jerseyans Sensitive to the Effects of Trade Agreements

Trade in New Jersey accounted for approximately 5.4% of total U.S. imports in 2015 (U.S. Census Bureau 2016a), while as of May 2016 it accounted for 2.1% of total U.S. exports (U.S. Census Bureau 2016b). New Jersey is therefore, like the U.S., a net importer of goods and services from abroad and many of its counties have been directly affected by changes in rules of trade. Meanwhile trade agreements, namely the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), have become a significant issue in the 2016 presidential election season. While trade agreements are being vilified by candidates in both parties, a recent NBC News and Wall Street Journal poll found that most Americans (55%) think that “free trade with foreign countries is good for America, because it opens up new markets and because the United States can't avoid it in a global economy” (Murray 2016). New Jerseyans, however, have more negative view than all Americans on the effect of trade agreements in three areas: their personal or financial situation, jobs, and consumer prices. Exploring why, original research on whether a decline in manufacturing employment in New Jersey is a factor is presented in this section alongside views on jobs. New Jersey Republicans, along with many in the party, depart from the traditional Republican pro-free trade stance and today are more likely than Democrats to view trade agreements as having negative effects in all three areas.

Background: Trade and Public Opinion

First, this section provides context for the current status of U.S. trade agreements and how the U.S. fairs in global trade negotiations. It is critical to understand the global trade system and the role the U.S. in shaping the rules of that system; alternatively, the effects of trade are known to be uneven and opposition is often expressed by people working in industries hardest hit from changes due to trade. Therefore, net economic benefits from trade are frequently juxtaposed against public opinion on trade. Overall, protectionist policies (e.g., tariffs) are lower in democracies but only if the public shows support for free trade (Kono 2008a; 2008b). Thus, there is an economic effect of public opinion on trade. Results from this poll and original research on the effect of trade on jobs in New Jersey suggest that New Jerseyans are more sensitive to the effects of trade and by extension, trade agreements, than the average American. Evidence from the behavior of New Jersey's political leaders supports this; in 2015, Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) sided against many Democrats in authorizing fast track authority to President Obama for trade negotiations.⁴³ At the local level, if people are adversely affected by trade it translates into greater polarization in Congressional candidates elected to office and in the voting behavior of Congressional representatives (Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Majlesi 2016). This polarizing effect on the public's support for parties and Congressional candidates varies along ethnic lines. In areas adversely affected by trade, a non-Hispanic white majority is more likely to favor Republican candidates whereas the same areas with white minorities are more likely to favor liberal Democrats (ibid p. 3). Overall, U.S. counties exposed to greater import competition are more likely to increase support for Democratic candidates (Che, Lu, Pierce, Schott, and Tao 2015). Once in power, support for protectionist bills is greater among Congressional members from trade-exposed districts (Autor et al, 2016 citing Che et al, 2015), demonstrating the sensitivity of elected officials to local effects of trade. While, traditionally, Republicans have touted the benefits of more free

⁴³ Salant, Jonathan. 2015. “Menendez challenges Obama again, this time on trade” NJ.com, April 22. Last Updated April 23.

http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/04/menendez_challenges_obama_again_this_time_on_trade.html

trade, public opinion on trade is more sensitive to local effects and ethnic or racial (and perhaps other) identities.

Background: The U.S. and the Current World Trade System

Setting aside public opinion, what is the current status of the U.S. and the global trade system? Recent evidence suggesting that the U.S. has been successful in negotiating trade provisions that benefit its interests (Allee and Lugg 2016, Busch and Pelc 2016). The US and EU continue to lead in the number of agreements they have signed in the last 15 years while other countries have joined them in increasingly turning toward these types of trade arrangements. The U.S. currently has trade agreements with 20 countries in 12 bilateral agreements and 2 multilateral agreements with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Dominican Republic-Central America FTA (CAFTA-DR). The TPP has been signed and is awaiting ratification by Senate while negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) are ongoing.⁴⁴ Trade agreements like the TPP is exactly where countries are vying for trade provisions to protect and advance their economies; the U.S. is leading that process. Overall, the number of regional trade agreements (RTAs)⁴⁵ in the current global economy reached 619 (with 413 currently in force) by December 1, 2015 (WTO 2015); mega-regional agreements like the TPP are fairly new, marking a major shift in how countries strategize and negotiate terms of trade from multilateral forums like the WTO to ‘minilateral’ forums limited to those with an invitation to negotiate. This proliferation of trade agreements, specifically those between wealthy and developing (i.e., North-South) and among developing countries (i.e., South-South)⁴⁶, reflects both an effort to fill a gap in trade negotiations due to the absence of successful multilateral negotiations in the current Doha Round of the WTO (started in January of 2000) and the growth of new global supply chains that have changed the way goods are sourced, manufactured, and sold around the world. Though the Nairobi Package adopted in December 2015 at the WTO Ministerial meeting signaled a revival of multilateral negotiations to some degree as it included major agreements on export subsidies in agriculture, expansion of the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) to include more technology goods, limits on food aid that protect local markets, and preferential treatment for services, issues that have long been sticking points for less developed countries (LDCs) in WTO negotiations (ICTSD 2015, UNCTAD 2015).

⁴⁴ For a review on the effects of Brexit, see:

Gray, Julie, Christian Jensen, and Jonathan Slapin. 2016. “No, Britain won’t get a better deal now. Here’s why Brexit will be very costly for both the U.K. and the E.U.” Washington Post Monkey Cage Blog, June 28. Accessed July 15. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/28/no-britain-wont-get-a-better-deal-now-heres-why-brex-it-will-be-very-costly-for-both-the-u-k-and-the-e-u/>

For how this might impact T-TIP negotiations, see:

Hallerberg, Mark. 2016. “Here are the E.U.’s four options for negotiating Brexit” Washington Post Monkey Cage Blog, June 29. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/29/here-are-the-e-u-s-four-options-for-negotiating-brex-it/>

⁴⁵ The use of the term RTA corresponds with the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) use of this term, which applies broadly to any bilateral and regional trade agreement outside the WTO. The category of RTAs, therefore, includes various trade arrangements. Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are also included in the larger category of RTAs, however by definition are not reciprocal; the 28 PTAs allowable under the WTO’s Enabling Clause and represent 4.4% of all RTAs & PTAs (WTO 2015).


⁴⁶ See Manger (2009) and Manger and Shadlen (2014) for explanations for the growth of North-South and South-South trade agreements.

This growth of trade agreements coupled with a de facto relaxation of the WTO review process for RTAs (Mavroidis 2011) translates into an elevated role for trade agreements, instead of the WTO, in shaping and/or serving as the primary mechanism for the substantive rules of the global trade system in the future. And given the primary role the U.S. has taken in this process, it is influential in determining the rules of trade in today’s global economy.

Trade Agreements and Personal or Family Financial Situation


When asked to think about the financial situation of them and their family, fewer New Jerseyans than all Americans, 36.8% compared to 49%, think that trade agreements such as NAFTA have definitely or probably helped.⁴⁷ More 41.6% New Jerseyans compared to 36% of all Americans think they have probably or definitely hurt (Pew May 2015).

Effects of Trade Agreements on Personal or Family’s Financial Situation



A plurality of Democrats, 34.8%, agree that trade agreements have probably helped while a plurality of Republicans and Independents agree that trade agreements have probably hurt their financial situation. The alignment with preferences of citizens with party or candidate platforms on this point is unclear, as this debate is ongoing within both parties.

Partisan Divide on Effects of Trade Agreements on Financial Situation





Income also influences views on whether trade agreements have helped or hurt someone’s financial situation. Overall, the middle-class is more likely to say trade agreements have probably hurt them while the upper class are more likely to say they have probably helped; 34.6% of people with more than \$150,000 of income compared to only 23.7% of people with less than \$25,000 saying that trade agreements have definitely or probably helped their financial situation.

⁴⁷ Stockton Q. 27. Source: Pew Research Center (May 2015) Q45.


New Jerseyans Pessimistic about Trade Agreements and U.S. Prices

When asked about the effect of trade agreements on prices, a plurality of New Jerseyans (33.1%) say that trade agreements lead to higher prices of goods sold in the U.S. while a plurality of all Americans (36%) say that they lower prices.⁴⁸





Despite a plurality of New Jerseyans being pessimistic about the effect of trade agreements on prices, Democrats are more likely to say that they lower prices with 34.3% compared to only 24.5% of Republicans. In contrast, close to a majority (43.2%) of Republicans think trade agreements lead to higher prices while only 24.3% of Democrats say the same.

Partisan Views on Effects of Trade Agreements on Prices



Most New Jerseyans Say Trade Agreements Lead to Job Losses


Another concern regarding trade agreements and trade is whether they lead to job creation, job losses, or have little to no effect on jobs. Compared to all Americans, 12% more New Jerseyans say they lead to job losses and 6.6% fewer New Jerseyans say they lead to job creation.⁴⁹



⁴⁸ Stockton Q.28. Source for question and American views: Pew Research Center (May 2015) Q46a.

⁴⁹ Stockton Q29. Source for question and for results for American public: Pew Research Center (May 2015) Q46c.

A strong majority of both Republicans (61.5%) and Independents (66.9%) say that trade agreements lead to job losses while a minority (47.9%) of Democrats feel the same. Though more Democrats are skeptical of trade agreements than not, as only 14.2% think they lead to job creation. So while there are partisan differences, overall a plurality of New Jerseyans do not perceive trade agreements as good for jobs.



Does Trade Really Impact Jobs in the U.S. or New Jersey? An Original Analysis

Are New Jerseyans right to be skeptical about trade agreements and jobs? In short, yes. Exposure to Chinese trade (i.e., imports) has led to a decrease in manufacturing employment in the United States: between 1990-2007, for every \$1,000 increase in import exposure per worker there was a decrease in employment by 3/4 % (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013, 2135). Between 1991-2007, imports from China have grown by 1,156% while exports from the U.S. to China have grown 456% (ibid, p. 2131). Furthermore, the losses in jobs in specific industries hurt by trade have not been offset by job increases in other industries less affected by trade (Autor, Dorn, Hanson 2016).

So has New Jersey, like the U.S., experienced job losses as a result of trade? A replication of a study by Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) for New Jersey reveals similar effects of Chinese imports on manufacturing employment in the state. Identified below are the three commercial zones for New Jersey which are aggregated by county for which trade data has been gathered (Tolbert and Sizer 1996; Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013; Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Price 2014).

| Commercial Zones* | New Jersey Counties |
|-------------------|--|
| 19500 | Monmouth County; Ocean County |
| 19600 | Bergen County; Essex County; Hudson County; Hunterdon County; Mercer County; Middlesex County; Morris County; Passaic County; Somerset County; Sussex County Union County; Warren County |
| 19700 | Atlantic County Burlington County Camden County Cape May County Cumberland County Gloucester County Salem County |

*1990 zone codes

Results in column 3 of the table below show that in New Jersey between 1990-2007, for every \$1,000 increase in imports per worker over each decade manufacturing unemployment is predicted to decrease by .76%.⁵⁰ Column 1 shows that between 1990-2000, the predicted effect of increased trade with China by the same amount (\$1,000 per worker) is 1.13% (a stronger and more significant effect). In 1990-2007, what happened in New Jersey was not unique; the same effect was observed at the national level in the original study. However in 1990-2000, the effect of trade on manufacturing employment was greater in New Jersey than the rest of the country. Part II of the table below shows the effect of changes in manufacturing unemployment on future import exposure as a test to see if job losses in manufacturing were caused by Chinese imports or if it was the other way around. Column 5 shows a significant negative change in manufacturing employment and future import exposure for the 1980s, though this result does not hold for the 1970s (column 4) or 1970-2000 (column 6) time periods. Unlike for the U.S. more broadly, in New Jersey a decline in the share of manufacturing employment has likely both followed and led to a surge of Chinese imports across different time periods.

Imports from China and Change of Manufacturing Employment in New Jersey's Commuting Zones, 1970-2007⁵¹

Dependent Variable: 10 x Annual Change in Manufacturing Emp/Working Age Pop (in %pts)


| | I. 1990-2007 | | | II. 1970-1990 (Pre-Exposure) | | |
|--|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| | 1990-2000 (1) | 2000-2007 (2) | 1990-2007 (3) | 1970-1980 (4) | 1980-1990 (5) | 1970-1990 (6) |
| (Δ Current Period Imports from China to US)/Worker | -1.13* (0.08) | -0.43 (0.14) | -0.76~ (0.10) | | | |
| (Δ Future Period Imports from China to US)/Worker | | | | 1.01 (0.86) | -3.41** (0.07) | -1.06 (0.16) |

⁵⁰ This interpretation of results in Table 2, and Table 2 itself, are a direct replication and citation of Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013, p. 2133- 2136 Table 2); this section heavily relies on the authors' original study in presenting and interpreting results of this replication using data for New Jersey.

⁵¹ This table, interpretation, and notes are a direct replication and citation of Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013, p. 2133- 2136 Table 2), edited to reflect results for the population of New Jersey. Notes: N=3 for each of NJ's commuting zones, except N=6 in columns 3 and 6. The variable 'future period imports' is defined as the average of the growth of a CZ's import exposure during the periods 1990-2000 and 2000-2007. All regressions include a constant and the models in columns 3 and 6 include a time dummy. Robust standard errors in parentheses were not clustered on state here; they were in Autor et al. These models are not weighted by start of period commuting zone share of national population; they were in Autor et al. ~ p ≤ 0.10, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01.

In Support of Trade Agreements as a Development Strategy

One potential benefit of trade agreements is that they hold the promise to advance global economic development by bringing developing countries into the global market with fewer restrictions. A majority, 62%, of New Jerseyans say that trade agreements are good for the people of developing countries, 8.9% say they are bad for people of developing countries, and 16.8% say they don't make a difference.⁵² A significant minority of 12.2% say mixed, it depends, or are not sure. There is little to no partisan divide with a majority of Democrats (64.2%), Republicans (59.9%), and Independents (64.2%) all agreeing that trade agreements are good for people of developing countries.



New Jerseyans views are slightly more favorable than all Americans on this question; 54% (a -8 point difference) of all Americans agree that trade agreements are good for people in developing countries (Pew May 2015). This signals that New Jerseyans are likely to support the use of trade agreements as a foreign policy strategy to increase economic development, even if the motivation is self-interest. It is assumed by some experts that developing countries entering into trade agreements with wealthier countries (i.e., North-South agreements) are doing so at a cost to the developing world (Wade 2006). The U.S. currently has a North-South agreement with 39 sub-Saharan African countries in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) intended to advance the foreign policy goal of increasing market access for developing countries, therefore supporting economic development. Research on this nonreciprocal trade agreement, for example, suggests that its effect on African trade to the U.S. since it was signed in 2000 has been mixed and is dependent on how the provisions in the agreements align with the domestic economies of participating countries (Zappile 2011).

The Rise of China as a Serious Problem for the U.S.

In addition to the adverse effect of Chinese imports on manufacturing employment in the U.S. (Autor, Dorn, Hanson 2013; 2016) and New Jersey, China has expanded its territorial claims in the South China Sea despite a recent ruling that their expansion violates the U.N. Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)⁵³ and Chinese military spending has increased by double-digit percentages in the last two decades (Bitzinger 2015). The underlying question of these trends coupled with annual GDP growth rates since 1991 ranging from a low of 6.7% in 1999 to a high of 13.6% in 2007 (World Bank 2016) is whether they signal a rising China that will overtake power from the U.S. or a rising China that will balance U.S. hegemony. Scholars in international relations disagree about the likelihood of a peaceful transition of power towards China and whether China will even rival the U.S. as a global hegemon, as noted in the discussion on foreign policy strategies. Finally, the views of New Jerseyans on the rise of

⁵² Stockton Q30. Source: Pew Research Center (May 2015) Q46e.


⁵³ For an explanation of why the Chinese will ignore this ruling and how their behavior falls within some global norms, see: Fing, Yu. 2016. "Why China Says No to the Arbitration on the South China Sea: Beijing will ignore the upcoming ruling — and with good reason." Foreign Policy Magazine, July 10. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/10/why-china-says-no-to-the-arbitration-on-the-south-china-sea/>

China presented below demonstrate a concern for the relative position of China vis-à-vis the U.S.; Americans, generally, are likely to be very concerned about China's economic relationship with the U.S. or its military power if they view China's rise as a threat to U.S. power. If the rise of China, however, is not viewed as a threat to U.S. power, we would likely observe New Jerseyans and Americans being less concerned about these dimensions of Chinese soft power (i.e., economic power and influence) and hard power (i.e., military capability).


Chinese Investment and Trade Positions

Chinese ownership of American debt is frequently referenced in speeches about the Chinese-U.S. relationship. The truth is that increasing demand since 1995 has made the U.S. an attractive economy for investment from all countries, including China (BEA 2016), and that continued investment is what supports high levels of imports. What is unique is the strong investment position of China relative to others and the continuation of a U.S. balance of payments characterized by a historically high trade deficit and investment surplus. In 2015, China was the #3 importer of U.S. goods and services accounting for 14.8% of U.S. exports while it was the #1 exporter to the U.S. accounting for 7.2% of American imports (U.S. Census 2016d). Canada and Mexico are also in the top three, though when countries are grouped together the E.U. is America's largest trade partner (ibid).

A strong majority of New Jerseyans (70.5%) think that the large amount of debt held by China is a very serious problem for the U.S.; 67% of all Americans feel the same. Only a small minority of 9.1% think that it is either not too serious or not a problem at all, which also aligns with the views of 8% of all Americans.⁵⁴ Overall, 88.7% of New Jerseyans and 89% of all Americans think the large amount of debt held by China is a very or somewhat serious problem for the U.S.



New Jerseyans' views on the U.S. trade deficit with China are less pessimistic on whether it is this problem for the U.S. compared to China's investment position. Still, a majority (56.2%) say that it is a very serious problem and only 11.1% view it as not too serious or not a problem at all.⁵⁵ This aligns with the views of all Americans: 52% of all Americans see it as a very serious problem and 34% see it as a somewhat serious problem. This means that 85.2% of New Jerseyans and 86% of all Americans see the trade deficit with China as a very or somewhat serious problem.




⁵⁴ Stockton Q33. Source for question and for results for American public: Pew Research Center (September 2015) Q26xf.

⁵⁵ Stockton Q34. Source for questions and results for American views: Pew Research Center (September 2015) Q26xg.

China’s Military Strength


An overwhelming majority of 86.1% of New Jerseyans say that China’s growing military strength is either a very serious or somewhat serious problem, with 51.3% saying it is very serious.⁵⁶ This reflects a concern for China’s hard power (i.e., military capabilities). While it has been estimated that Chinese military spending has increased by double-digit percentages in the last two decades (Bitzinger 2015), reliable and valid data on Chinese military spending is difficult to ascertain. For example, in 2007 it was estimated by the Pentagon to be anywhere from \$97 billion to \$139 billion; in contrast, “the 2008 U.S. budget was \$481.4 billion plus \$141.7 billion for the ‘Global War on Terror’” (Bajoria 2009). Thus, public concern about China’s military reflects the realities of its growth coupled with territorial expansion in the South China Sea and other concerns identified by the U.S.⁵⁷



Republicans see Rise of China as Major Threat

Partisan differences reflect a much greater concern by Republicans and Independents for China’s investment and trade positions in the U.S. while 15.2% more Republicans see China’s military strength as a major threat for the U.S. compared to both Democrats and Independents. More Independents are concerned about the economic interdependence of the U.S. and China instead of Chinese military strength while more Republicans are concerned about the Chinese investment position in the U.S. followed by its military strength, with trade falling behind as a possible threat.

Partisan Divide on China as a Serious Threat



New Jerseyans Want Better Relationship with Cuba




New Jersey’s political leaders are divided on the official U.S. relationship with Cuba, despite New Jersey being home to the second highest number of 81,000 Cubans in the U.S. behind Florida, which is home to 990,000 or 2/3 of the Cuban population (Pew Hispanic Center 2006, 3). Sen. Menendez has publicly spoke against normalizing the diplomatic relationship

⁵⁶ Stockton Q35. Source for questions and results for American views: Pew Research Center (July 2015) Q26xb.

⁵⁷ See this report for more: Office of Secretary of Defense. 2016. “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016.” Accessed June 1. <http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf>.

with Cuba⁵⁸ while legislators from Bergen County were criticized by local Cuban-Americans and police unions after returning from travel to Cuba in early 2016⁵⁹.

Still, a 65.5% majority of New Jerseyans favor establishing diplomatic relations and 67.4% support ending the trade embargo with Cuba, though this is less favorable than all Americans' views (Pew July 2015).⁶⁰ An even stronger majority of 73% of all Americans are for the U.S. establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba while 72% are for ending the trade embargo, an increase in support from January 2015 by 10 and 6 points, respectively (ibid). However, there is a deep partisan divide on this question with 60.2% Republicans opposing re-establishing diplomatic ties and 52.9% opposing ending the U.S. trade embargo (this requires Congressional approval). As of June 2016, the U.S. had exported 104.2 million USD of goods and services to Cuba while there were 0\$ in imports (U.S. Census Bureau 2016e); restrictions that have been lifted since late 2014 have been mostly limited to travel and business regulations.⁶¹



⁵⁸ Salant, Jonathan. 2015. "Menendez: Diplomatic relations with Cuba 'not in our national interest'" NJ.com, July 1. Updated July 2.

http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/07/menendez_establishing_relations_with_cuba_is_not_i.html

⁵⁹ Ensslin, John C. and Todd South, 2016. "Bergen lawmakers under fire for trip to Cuba." NorthJersey.com, February 1. Updated February 1. <http://www.northjersey.com/news/bergen-lawmakers-under-fire-for-trip-to-cuba-1.1503534?page=all>

⁶⁰ Stockton Q31-32. Source for questions and results for American views: Pew Research Center (July 2015).

⁶¹ Go here for more on the U.S.-Cuban relationship:

Renwick, Danielle. 2016. "U.S.-Cuba Relations." *Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounders*. Last Modified March 24, 2016. <http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113>


Fighting Terrorism

Responses from New Jerseyans on effective options to fight terrorism⁶² are compared in this section to views of experts participating in the Teaching, Research, & International Policy (TRIP) Snap Polls, comprised of a sample of 4,078 “individuals ... employed at a U.S. college or university in a political science department or professional school and teach or conduct research on issues that cross international borders” (Maliniak, Daniel, Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers, and Michael J. Tierney 2014)⁶³.


New Jerseyans Agree with Experts on Sending Trainers/Special Forces and Blocking Financing

First, New Jerseyans agree with experts that sending U.S. trainers and special forces and blocking financing of suspected terrorists are always or mostly effective to fight terrorism.⁶⁴ Blocking financing has been a centerpiece of global efforts.⁶⁵ Though notably, compliance with U.N. resolutions (i.e., whether countries actually adopt and/or implement them in domestic law) is not perfect (Stiles and Thayne 2004) and therefore loopholes remain.

Sending US trainers and special forces to countries where terrorists operate



Blocking suspected terrorist financing



⁶² Stockton Q43-47. Source: TRIP (September 2015).

⁶³ The TRIP program and surveys are based at William & Mary’s Institute for the Theory & Practice of International Relations. Disclosure: the author is included in this sample and has participated in several TRIP 78

⁶⁴ Stockton Q44 and 47. Source: TRIP (September 2015).

⁶⁵ These include but are not limited to U.N. Security Council resolutions 2253 (2015), 2199 (2015), 1989 (2011), 1373 (2001), and 1267 (1999).

New Jerseyans Clash with Experts on Drones to Fight Terrorism


Overall, New Jerseyans depart sharply from experts on whether drone strikes or limiting flows of refugees and increasing border controls are effective.⁶⁶ On drone strikes, 60.1% of experts say they are rarely or never effective while 78.3% of New Jerseyans say they are always or mostly effective.

There is a partisan divide with Republicans more likely than Democrats (a +10.5 point difference) to say that drone strikes are very effective, though a majority of both (85.7% Republicans and 79.7% Democrats) both think drone strikes are either always or mostly effective. As the use of drones as a weapon delivery system expands and as drones themselves are reproduced and manufactured in greater numbers, questions remain about whether drone strikes fit within the bounds of existing international humanitarian law on the rules of engagement in armed conflict to limit its effects (i.e., 1949 Geneva Conventions, 1977 Protocol I and II to Geneva, and more)⁶⁷ and a global arms control regime centered on the norm of non-proliferation (Zenko and Kreps 2014; Kreps and Zenko 2014). Do they work? This question is difficult yet crucial for countries to grapple with, starting with working towards consensus on defining “work”; that is, to what ends can drones be used effectively in intelligence-gathering versus combat and who should hold authority over their use? As a result, evidence on their “effectiveness” is difficult to gather. Reducing recruitment is one area in which drones are theorized to be effective, yet data on recruitment is almost impossible to gather; one recent study notes this drawback and instead, finds that U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan led to a decrease in incidences and lethality of terror attacks (Johnston and Sarbahi 2016). Others focus on the politics of their use, noting that any effect they may have specific to fighting terrorism is too limited to successfully advance broader U.S. interests in the first place (Hazelton 2016).


New Jerseyans Clash with Experts on Enhanced Interrogation to Fight Terrorism

New Jerseyans are sharply divided with experts on whether enhanced interrogation is effective in fighting terrorism, with an overwhelming majority of 90.9% of experts saying it is rarely or never effective while 47.8% of New Jerseyans say it is always or mostly effective.⁶⁸

U.S. air strikes against suspected terrorists by drones or unmanned aircraft



Using enhanced interrogation or torture against suspected terrorists who are captured




⁶⁶ Stockton Q43 and 46. Source: TRIP (September 2015).

⁶⁷ For more on International Humanitarian Law see: https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf


⁶⁸ Stockton Q45. Source: TRIP (September 2015).

There is a sharp partisan gap with only 30.9% Democrats saying it is always or mostly effective in contrast to a strong majority of 74.5% Republicans. A large minority of 45.3% of Democrats think it is never effective while only 11.9% of Republicans agree.

Democrats on Enhanced Interrogation




Republicans on Enhanced Interrogation




There is also a gender gap, though not as strong as the partisan divide. A majority of 54.6% men agree that enhanced interrogation is either very or mostly effective while 41.9% of women say the same; in addition, only 14.% of women say it is very effective compared to 26.4% of men. Blacks are split with a plurality (36.8%) saying it is never effective, though 44.1% say it is sometimes *or* always effective. A majority (55.7%) of Hispanics, on the other hand, think enhanced interrogation is always or mostly effective.

Women on Enhanced Interrogation



Men on Enhanced Interrogation



Enhanced interrogation techniques were part of the Extraordinary Rendition Program (ERP) run by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to interrogate enemy combatants following 09/11 attacks and throughout the 2003 U.S. invasion in Iraq in “black sites” around the world that were outside of U.S. sovereign territory. Human rights groups, lawyers, and legal scholars have since criticized the ERP, labeling specific enhanced interrogation techniques as *torture* and finding both these techniques and the process of rendition incompatible with international law.⁶⁹ Former CIA directors and other officials remain split on the legality and morality of the program while current Director John Brennan has spoken publicly against the use of specific interrogation techniques.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ For further details and legal analyses of ERP see Satterthwaite (2007) and Sadat (2005).

⁷⁰ See also *The Spymasters - CIA in the Crosshairs*. Dir. Gedeon Naudet. Showtime, 2016 for interviews of all twelve living CIA directors. See also:

Morton, Victor. 2016. “CIA would defy presidential orders to torture terror suspects, director says” *The Washington Post*, April 10. Accessed June 1. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/apr/10/cia-wont-torture-terror-suspects-regardless-presid/>.

New Jerseyans Clash with Experts on Limiting Refugees and Increasing Border Controls to Fight Terrorism

On limiting refugees and increasing border controls, an overwhelming majority of 85.2% of experts agree they are rarely or never effective while 67.1% of New Jerseyans say the opposite, that they are always or mostly effective. The public, therefore, is more likely than experts to connect migration and refugee flows to terrorism while experts are more likely to see them as distinct.⁷¹


Plurality of New Jerseyans Unwilling to Settle Syrian Refugees

Related to views on refugees and border controls is current U.S. policy specific to Syrian refugees. As a signatory to the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, though not the original 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the U.S. accepts international law governing the definition and obligations for treatment of refugees. A refugee is someone:

"owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."⁷²



The U.S. codified this definition and established the current U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), overseen and administered by Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Health and Human Services (State Department 2016b), in the Refugee Act of 1980 (Refugee Council 2016). In 2015, the U.S. took in 66,500 refugees or 60% of the world's total (UNHCR 2015). While globally, 2015 saw record numbers of 16.12 million, 37.49 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), and 3.22 million asylum-seekers (people who have requested asylum but have not yet been approved as refugees), resettlement in the U.S. was at its highest in 2006 at close to 1 million prior to the start of the Syrian conflict (UNHCR 2016).

Limiting the flow of migrants/refugees and increasing border controls



⁷¹ Note the order of questions in the Stockton poll asked first about


⁷² The full text of the Convention on the Status of Refugees can be accessed here: <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/refugees.pdf>.



A plurality of New Jerseyans (41.7%) say not to accept any Syrian refugees into the U.S., compared to 36.4% who want to proceed with Obama’s late-2015 plan to resettle 10,000 refugees without religious screening and 9.7% who want to resettle only Christians from Syria.⁷³ However, this is a more generous than the views expressed by the American public in November 2015 (Bloomberg), where a majority of all Americans (53%) say not to accept refugees and only 28% are in favor of proceeding with the plan to settle 10,000 without religious screening.

There is a deep partisan divide on whether the U.S. should accept Syrian refugees with a strong majority (70.6%) of Republicans against and 62.5% of Democrats in favor of the plan to accept 10,000 refugees.


Partisan Divide on Syrian Refugees




Plurality Oppose Sending Ground Troops to Syria

A plurality of New Jerseyans (42.9%) oppose sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants in Iraq and Syria though only by a margin of 5.5%.⁷⁴ All Americans are more closely split with 44% in support and 45% in opposition of sending ground troops (Bloomberg 2015).

However for both New Jersey and the American public, there is a deep divide among parties on this decision. A strong majority of New Jersey Republicans (65.4%) compared to a minority of Democrats (32.8%) and Independents (42.8%) oppose sending ground troops. This is in line with the high number of Republicans that deemed military superiority as a very effective military strategy and those that thought the U.S. relied on its military strength to achieve its foreign policy goals too little; Republicans,



Partisan Divide on Sending Ground Troops to Iraq and Syria




⁷³ Stockton Q36. Source: Bloomberg Politics (November 2015).

⁷⁴ Stockton Q38. Source: ibid.

when faced with both abstract and specific policy choices tend to favor military intervention compared to Democrats.

New Jerseyans Favor the U.S. to Led Effort to Defeat ISIS

Finally, New Jerseyans assess whether defeating ISIS is more likely if led by a) the United States; b) a coalition of Middle Eastern states; or c) NATO.⁷⁵ Each option was asked independently, as there could be a combination of these options for specific operations as part of a broader strategy. A strong majority of 71.3% of New Jerseyans overwhelmingly agree or strongly agree that efforts to defeat ISIS are more likely to be successful if led by the U.S.; in contrast, close to a majority of 47.3% of experts disagree or strongly disagree that a U.S. led effort would be successful. New Jerseyans are divided along party lines with 82.3% of Republicans in agreement or strong agreement that a U.S.-led effort would be successful while 65.9% of Democrats say the same. Still, experts are likely dubious about a U.S.-led effort in part because of the long memory of Iraq and other well-documented examples of U.S. intervention gone awry.⁷⁶



A majority of both New Jerseyans and experts agree that efforts led by a coalition of Middle Eastern States (e.g., Arab League’s recently established “response force”). Republicans are less confident than Democrats by a 15 point difference, however a majority of both (61.8% and 76.8% respectively) agree it is likely to be successful. These views may reflect the rise of regional organizations as legitimate authorities in global governance, demonstrated notably in efforts of the African Union to assert its influence and control over security operations within its region including formal partnerships with U.N. peacekeeping missions.⁷⁷ Though there are concerns over impartiality, capacity, and more, regional organizations enjoy a degree of legitimacy that outsiders (i.e., the U.S.) might not.

The least number of both experts (30.87%) and New Jerseyans (43.4%) say that a NATO-led effort to defeat ISIS is likely to be successful. Fewer Republicans (31.3%) are confident than Democrats (54%) in NATO, reflecting a departure from traditional partisan emphasis on security alliances.

⁷⁵ Stockton Q39-41. Source: TRIP (2015).

⁷⁶ See “War with Iraq is not in America’s National Interest.” *New York Times*, September 26 2000. Accessed June 1, 2016. http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/TimesAd_01.pdf (advertisement signed by 33 international relations scholars)

⁷⁷ See the following for more on how Arab League’s new force might alter political alliances in the region: Stavridis, James. 2015. “The Arab NATO.” *Foreign Policy Magazine*, April 5. Accessed December 1, 2015. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/09/the-arab-nato-saudi-arabia-iraq-yemen-iran/>

Conclusion

Overall, New Jerseyans' views on foreign policy issues relevant in the 2016 presidential election highlight the local context of many of these questions (e.g., trade, military, and immigration), variation according to partisanship, ideology, gender, generation, education, income, and race and ethnicity, and the degree to which the public can be disconnected from experts in these fields (e.g., climate change). This underscores the benefits for elected officials and other policymakers to more closely follow their constituents on these and other issues; conversely, the public also needs to express their views at the state and national level. The summary of findings (p. 5) provides a review of results from this poll. On many foreign policy issues New Jerseyans depart from experts, particularly on security-related issues; for example, experts are less willing to endorse many of the tactics the public supports to combat terrorism. Furthermore, deep divisions exist across party, gender, ethnicity, and generation for strategies to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals, immigration, climate change mitigation, and more. These differences need to be more fully understood by policymakers before they make decisions; regardless of the decision, there is a high probability of a lack of consensus. The next U.S. president will be likely be tasked to make decisions about all of these issues and should carefully balance public opinion alongside expressed views of experts and advisors in their respective fields.

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Appendix A. Complete Poll Results

Q1. Compared to ten years ago, do you think the United States plays:

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| A more important and powerful role as a world leader today | 176 | 21.0 | 21.0 | 21.0 |
| A less important and powerful role as a world leader today | 374 | 44.5 | 44.5 | 65.6 |
| About as important a role as it did | 270 | 32.2 | 32.2 | 97.8 |
| A MORE IMPORTANT BUT LESS POWERFUL ROLE (VOL) | 3 | .3 | .3 | 98.1 |
| A LESS IMPORTANT BUT MORE POWERFUL ROLE (VOL) | 1 | .1 | .1 | 98.2 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 15 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q2. Now, I'd like your opinion about some possible international concerns for the U.S. Please indicate whether you think each of the following is a major threat, a minor threat or not a threat to the well being of the United States: Growing authoritarianism in Russia.

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid MAJOR THREAT | 310 | 37.0 | 37.0 | 37.0 |
| MINOR THREAT | 406 | 48.4 | 48.4 | 85.3 |
| NOT A THREAT | 86 | 10.2 | 10.2 | 95.6 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 37 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q3 North Korea's nuclear program

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid MAJOR THREAT | 600 | 71.5 | 71.5 | 71.5 |
| MINOR THREAT | 186 | 22.2 | 22.2 | 93.7 |
| NOT A THREAT | 44 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 98.9 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 8 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 99.9 |
| REFUSE | 1 | .1 | .1 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q4. Iran's nuclear program

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid MAJOR THREAT | 571 | 68.1 | 68.1 | 68.1 |
| MINOR THREAT | 197 | 23.5 | 23.5 | 91.5 |
| NOT A THREAT | 59 | 7.1 | 7.1 | 98.6 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 12 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q5. The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid MAJOR THREAT | 352 | 41.9 | 41.9 | 41.9 |
| MINOR THREAT | 373 | 44.5 | 44.5 | 86.4 |
| NOT A THREAT | 101 | 12.1 | 12.1 | 98.5 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 13 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q6. The Islamic militant group in Iraq and Syria, known as ISIS

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| MAJOR THREAT | 720 | 85.8 | 85.8 | 85.8 |
| MINOR THREAT | 105 | 12.5 | 12.5 | 98.3 |
| NOT A THREAT | 15 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q7. Cyber attacks

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| MAJOR THREAT | 651 | 77.6 | 77.6 | 77.6 |
| MINOR THREAT | 150 | 17.9 | 17.9 | 95.5 |
| NOT A THREAT | 28 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 98.8 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 10 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q8. For each approach I name, please tell me how effective you think it is in achieving the foreign policy goals of the United States – very effective, somewhat effective, not so effective or not effective at all. Strengthening the United Nations

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| VERY EFFECTIVE | 252 | 30.0 | 30.0 | 30.0 |
| SOMEWHAT EFFECTIVE | 301 | 35.9 | 35.9 | 65.9 |
| NOT SO EFFECTIVE | 127 | 15.1 | 15.1 | 81.0 |
| NOT EFFECTIVE AT ALL | 134 | 16.0 | 16.0 | 97.1 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 25 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q9. Maintaining U.S. military superiority

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| VERY EFFECTIVE | 503 | 59.9 | 59.9 | 59.9 |
| SOMEWHAT EFFECTIVE | 210 | 25.1 | 25.1 | 85.0 |
| NOT SO EFFECTIVE | 69 | 8.2 | 8.2 | 93.2 |
| NOT EFFECTIVE AT ALL | 46 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 98.7 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 10 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 99.9 |
| REFUSE | 1 | .1 | .1 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q10. Placing economic sanctions on other countries

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| VERY EFFECTIVE | 266 | 31.7 | 31.7 | 31.7 |
| SOMEWHAT EFFECTIVE | 377 | 44.9 | 44.9 | 76.6 |
| NOT SO EFFECTIVE | 96 | 11.4 | 11.4 | 88.0 |
| NOT EFFECTIVE AT ALL | 80 | 9.5 | 9.5 | 97.5 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 21 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q11. Maintaining alliances with other countries

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| VERY EFFECTIVE | 553 | 65.9 | 65.9 | 65.9 |
| SOMEWHAT EFFECTIVE | 229 | 27.3 | 27.3 | 93.1 |
| NOT SO EFFECTIVE | 36 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 97.4 |
| NOT EFFECTIVE AT ALL | 19 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 99.7 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 3 | .3 | .3 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q12. Providing economic aid to other countries

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| VERY EFFECTIVE | 207 | 24.7 | 24.7 | 24.7 |
| SOMEWHAT EFFECTIVE | 401 | 47.8 | 47.8 | 72.5 |
| NOT SO EFFECTIVE | 118 | 14.1 | 14.1 | 86.6 |
| NOT EFFECTIVE AT ALL | 93 | 11.1 | 11.1 | 97.6 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 19 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 99.9 |
| REFUSE | 1 | .1 | .1 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q13. Providing military aid to other countries

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| VERY EFFECTIVE | 200 | 23.9 | 23.9 | 23.9 |
| SOMEWHAT EFFECTIVE | 408 | 48.7 | 48.7 | 72.5 |
| NOT SO EFFECTIVE | 128 | 15.3 | 15.3 | 87.8 |
| NOT EFFECTIVE AT ALL | 81 | 9.6 | 9.6 | 97.5 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 20 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 99.8 |
| REFUSE | 2 | .2 | .2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q14. Negotiating international treaties

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| VERY EFFECTIVE | 388 | 46.3 | 46.3 | 46.3 |
| SOMEWHAT EFFECTIVE | 318 | 37.9 | 37.9 | 84.1 |
| NOT SO EFFECTIVE | 61 | 7.3 | 7.3 | 91.4 |
| NOT EFFECTIVE AT ALL | 51 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 97.4 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 21 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 99.9 |
| REFUSE | 1 | .1 | .1 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q15. Do you think the United States should:

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Accept decisions of the United Nations even when it disagrees with them | 342 | 40.8 | 40.8 | 40.8 |
| Or reject decisions of the United Nations that it disagrees with? | 417 | 49.7 | 49.7 | 90.5 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 75 | 9.0 | 9.0 | 99.5 |
| REFUSE | 4 | .5 | .5 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q16. In deciding on its foreign policies, how much consideration should the United States give to the views of its allies:

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| A great deal | 237 | 28.3 | 28.3 | 28.3 |
| A good amount | 457 | 54.5 | 54.5 | 82.8 |
| Only a little | 115 | 13.7 | 13.7 | 96.5 |
| Or none? | 19 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 98.7 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 10 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 99.9 |
| REFUSE | 1 | .1 | .1 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q20. Turning to the issue of climate change, in your view is global climate change:

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------------------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| A very serious problem | 473 | 56.3 | 56.3 | 56.3 |
| Somewhat serious | 190 | 22.7 | 22.7 | 79.0 |
| Not too serious | 99 | 11.8 | 11.8 | 90.8 |
| Or not a problem? | 69 | 8.2 | 8.2 | 99.0 |
| CLIMATE CHANGE DOES NOT EXIST (VOL) | 5 | .6 | .6 | 99.7 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW (VOL) | 2 | .2 | .2 | 99.9 |
| REFUSE (VOL) | 1 | .1 | .1 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q21. How do you feel about the United States participating in the Paris 2015 international agreement to limit the release of greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| STRONGLY SUPPORT | 428 | 51.0 | 51.0 | 51.0 |
| SOMEWHAT SUPPORT | 208 | 24.8 | 24.8 | 75.7 |
| SOMEWHAT OPPOSE | 85 | 10.2 | 10.2 | 85.9 |
| OR STRONGLY OPPOSE | 73 | 8.7 | 8.7 | 94.6 |
| OTHER (VOL) | 4 | .5 | .5 | 95.0 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW (VOL) | 41 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 99.9 |
| REFUSE (VOL) | 1 | .1 | .1 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q22. Who should contribute more to reducing greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change – wealthy countries such as the U.S., Japan, and Germany that have released more greenhouse gases in the past, or poorer countries such as China or India that will be releasing more greenhouse gases in the future?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| WEALTHY COUNTRIES | 222 | 26.5 | 26.5 | 26.5 |
| DEVELOPING COUNTRIES | 289 | 34.5 | 34.5 | 60.9 |
| THEY SHOULD CONTRIBUTE THE SAME | 268 | 31.9 | 31.9 | 92.9 |
| NONE CONTRIBUTE | 15 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 94.7 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW (VOL) | 40 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 99.4 |
| REFUSE (VOL) | 5 | .6 | .6 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q24. As you may know, the United States and other countries have announced a deal to lift economic sanctions against Iran in exchange for Iran agreeing not to produce nuclear weapons. How much confidence do you have in the U.S. and international agencies' ability to monitor Iran's compliance:

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| A great deal of confidence | 90 | 10.7 | 10.7 | 10.7 |
| Some confidence | 256 | 30.5 | 30.5 | 41.1 |
| Not too much confidence | 208 | 24.8 | 24.8 | 65.9 |
| Or no confidence at all | 280 | 33.4 | 33.4 | 99.3 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW (VOL) | 6 | .7 | .7 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q25. The following questions are about immigration. Which comes closer to your view about how to handle undocumented immigrants who are now living in the United States:

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| They should not be allowed to stay in the country legally | 178 | 21.2 | 21.2 | 21.2 |
| Or there should be a way for them to stay in the country legally, if certain requirements are met | 644 | 76.8 | 76.8 | 98.0 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW (VOL) | 15 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 99.8 |
| REFUSE (VOL) | 2 | .2 | .2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q25A. And do you think immigrants who are in the United States illegally and meet the requirements should be allowed to:

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Stay legally | 50 | 5.9 | 7.5 | 7.5 |
| Apply for U.S. citizenship | 359 | 42.8 | 54.4 | 61.9 |
| Or apply for permanent residency but not U.S. citizenship | 227 | 27.0 | 34.3 | 96.2 |
| OTHER (VOL) | 8 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 97.4 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW (VOL) | 15 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 99.7 |
| REFUSE (VOL) | 2 | .2 | .3 | 100.0 |
| Total | 661 | 78.8 | 100.0 | |

Q27. Thinking about the financial situation of you and your family, do you think trade agreements such as NAFTA have definitely helped, probably helped, probably hurt, or definitely hurt your family's financial situation?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid DEFINITELY HELPED | 25 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 |
| PROBABLY HELPED | 205 | 24.4 | 24.4 | 27.3 |
| PROBABLY HURT | 223 | 26.6 | 26.6 | 53.9 |
| DEFINITELY HURT | 126 | 15.0 | 15.0 | 68.9 |
| NEITHER HELPED NOR HURT | 104 | 12.4 | 12.4 | 81.3 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW (VOL) | 150 | 17.9 | 17.9 | 99.2 |
| REFUSE (VOL) | 7 | .8 | .8 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q28. In your opinion, do trade agreements make the price of products sold in the United States higher, lower or not make a difference?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid HIGHER | 278 | 33.1 | 33.1 | 33.1 |
| LOWER | 243 | 29.0 | 29.0 | 62.1 |
| NOT MAKE A DIFFERENCE | 188 | 22.4 | 22.4 | 84.5 |
| MIXED/DEPENDS (VOL) | 59 | 7.1 | 7.1 | 91.6 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW (VOL) | 71 | 8.4 | 8.4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q29. Do you think trade agreements create jobs in the United States, lead to job losses, or not make any difference?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| CREATE JOBS | 88 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 10.4 |
| LEAD TO JOB LOSSES | 487 | 58.0 | 58.0 | 68.5 |
| NOT MAKE A DIFFERENCE | 169 | 20.1 | 20.1 | 88.6 |
| MIXED/DEPENDS (VOL) | 46 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 94.0 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW (VOL) | 50 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q30. Are trade agreements good for the people of developing countries, bad for the people of developing countries, or don't they make a difference?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| GOOD | 520 | 62.0 | 62.0 | 62.0 |
| BAD | 75 | 8.9 | 8.9 | 70.9 |
| DON'T MAKE A DIFFERENCE | 141 | 16.8 | 16.8 | 87.6 |
| MIXED/DEPENDS (VOL) | 45 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 93.0 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW (VOL) | 57 | 6.8 | 6.8 | 99.9 |
| REFUSE (VOL) | 1 | .1 | .1 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q31. Now, I want to ask your opinions on U.S. relationships with Cuba. Do you support or oppose of the United States re-establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| SUPPORT | 566 | 67.4 | 67.4 | 67.4 |
| OPPOSE | 220 | 26.2 | 26.2 | 93.6 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 51 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 99.8 |
| REFUSE | 2 | .2 | .2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q32. Do you support or oppose the United States ending its trade embargo with Cuba?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| SUPPORT | 549 | 65.5 | 65.5 | 65.5 |
| OPPOSE | 227 | 27.1 | 27.1 | 92.5 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 60 | 7.1 | 7.1 | 99.7 |
| REFUSE | 3 | .3 | .3 | 100.0 |
| Total | 839 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Q33. (The following conditions about) China that may or may not be problems for the US. Please tell me if you think it is a very serious problem, a somewhat serious problem, not too serious, or not a problem.

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| VERY SERIOUS | 591 | 70.5 | 70.7 | 70.7 |
| SOMEWHAT SERIOUS | 153 | 18.2 | 18.3 | 89.0 |
| NOT TOO SERIOUS | 47 | 5.6 | 5.6 | 94.6 |
| NOT A PROBLEM | 30 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 98.2 |
| NOT SURE/ DON'T KNOW | 12 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 99.7 |
| REFUSE | 3 | .3 | .3 | 100.0 |
| Total | 836 | 99.6 | 100.0 | |

Q34. The U.S. trade deficit with China

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| VERY SERIOUS | 472 | 56.2 | 56.4 | 56.4 |
| SOMEWHAT SERIOUS | 243 | 29.0 | 29.1 | 85.5 |
| NOT TOO SERIOUS | 55 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 92.0 |
| NOT A PROBLEM | 38 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 96.6 |
| NOT SURE/ DON'T KNOW | 27 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 99.8 |
| REFUSE | 2 | .2 | .2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 836 | 99.6 | 100.0 | |

Q35. China's growing military strength

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| VERY SERIOUS | 430 | 51.3 | 51.5 | 51.5 |
| SOMEWHAT SERIOUS | 292 | 34.8 | 34.9 | 86.4 |
| NOT TOO SERIOUS | 59 | 7.1 | 7.1 | 93.5 |
| NOT A PROBLEM | 37 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 97.9 |
| NOT SURE/ DON'T KNOW | 16 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 99.8 |
| REFUSE | 2 | .2 | .2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 836 | 99.6 | 100.0 | |

Q36. Shifting to the current civil war in Syria, which of the following do you think is the best approach for the United States to take:

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Proceed with the plan to resettle 10,000 refugees without religious screening | 306 | 36.4 | 36.7 | 36.7 |
| Resettle only Christian refugees from Syria | 81 | 9.6 | 9.7 | 46.4 |
| Do not accept any Syrian refugees into the U.S. | 350 | 41.7 | 42.0 | 88.4 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW (VOL) | 75 | 9.0 | 9.1 | 97.5 |
| REFUSE (VOL) | 21 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 100.0 |
| Total | 833 | 99.3 | 100.0 | |

Q37. Regarding the role of the U.S. military, in general, does the United States rely on military strength too much, too little or about the right amount to achieve its foreign policy goals?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| TOO LITTLE | 261 | 31.2 | 31.4 | 31.4 |
| TOO MUCH | 247 | 29.4 | 29.7 | 61.1 |
| ABOUT THE RIGHT AMOUNT | 296 | 35.3 | 35.6 | 96.7 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 18 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 98.8 |
| REFUSE | 10 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 832 | 99.2 | 100.0 | |

Q38. Would you support or oppose the United States sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants in Iraq and Syria?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| SUPPORT | 360 | 42.9 | 43.3 | 43.3 |
| OPPOSE | 406 | 48.4 | 48.8 | 92.1 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 54 | 6.4 | 6.5 | 98.6 |
| REFUSE | 12 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 832 | 99.2 | 100.0 | |

Q39. Indicate your level of agreement with the following statements. Please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree for each. Defeating ISIS is more likely to be successful if led by United States?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| STRONGLY AGREE | 348 | 41.5 | 41.8 | 41.8 |
| SOMEWHAT AGREE | 250 | 29.8 | 30.0 | 71.9 |
| NEUTRAL (VOL) | 26 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 75.0 |
| SOMEWHAT DISAGREE | 105 | 12.5 | 12.6 | 87.6 |
| STRONGLY DISAGREE | 81 | 9.7 | 9.8 | 97.3 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 10 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 98.5 |
| REFUSE | 12 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 100.0 |
| Total | 832 | 99.2 | 100.0 | |

Q40. Defeating ISIS is more likely to be successful if led by a coalition of Middle Eastern states?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| STRONGLY AGREE | 339 | 40.4 | 40.8 | 40.8 |
| SOMEWHAT AGREE | 239 | 28.5 | 28.7 | 69.5 |
| NEUTRAL (VOL) | 22 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 72.1 |
| SOMEWHAT DISAGREE | 110 | 13.1 | 13.2 | 85.3 |
| STRONGLY DISAGREE | 94 | 11.2 | 11.3 | 96.6 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 15 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 98.4 |
| REFUSE | 13 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 100.0 |
| Total | 832 | 99.2 | 100.0 | |

Q41. Defeating ISIS is more likely to be successful if led by NATO?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| STRONGLY AGREE | 107 | 12.7 | 12.9 | 12.9 |
| SOMEWHAT AGREE | 258 | 30.7 | 31.0 | 43.8 |
| NEUTRAL (VOL) | 37 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 48.3 |
| SOMEWHAT DISAGREE | 200 | 23.8 | 24.0 | 72.4 |
| STRONGLY DISAGREE | 178 | 21.2 | 21.4 | 93.8 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 41 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 98.6 |
| REFUSE | 11 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 100.0 |
| Total | 832 | 99.2 | 100.0 | |

Q43. Please tell me if you think each of the following options for fighting terrorism is always effective, mostly effective, rarely effective or never effective. U.S. air strikes against suspected terrorists by drones or unmanned aircraft

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| ALWAYS EFFECTIVE | 281 | 33.5 | 33.8 | 33.8 |
| MOSTLY EFFECTIVE | 376 | 44.8 | 45.1 | 79.0 |
| RARELY EFFECTIVE | 82 | 9.8 | 9.9 | 88.8 |
| NEVER EFFECTIVE | 52 | 6.2 | 6.3 | 95.1 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 25 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 98.1 |
| REFUSE | 16 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 100.0 |
| Total | 832 | 99.2 | 100.0 | |

Q44. Sending US trainers and special forces to countries where terrorists operate

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| ALWAYS EFFECTIVE | 220 | 26.2 | 26.4 | 26.4 |
| MOSTLY EFFECTIVE | 391 | 46.6 | 47.0 | 73.4 |
| RARELY EFFECTIVE | 117 | 13.9 | 14.0 | 87.4 |
| NEVER EFFECTIVE | 68 | 8.1 | 8.2 | 95.6 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 22 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 98.2 |
| REFUSE | 15 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 100.0 |
| Total | 832 | 99.2 | 100.0 | |

Q45. Using enhanced interrogation or torture against suspected terrorists who are captured

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| ALWAYS EFFECTIVE | 171 | 20.4 | 20.6 | 20.6 |
| MOSTLY EFFECTIVE | 230 | 27.4 | 27.6 | 48.2 |
| RARELY EFFECTIVE | 150 | 17.9 | 18.0 | 66.2 |
| NEVER EFFECTIVE | 233 | 27.7 | 28.0 | 94.2 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 30 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 97.8 |
| REFUSE | 18 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 100.0 |
| Total | 832 | 99.2 | 100.0 | |

Q46. Limiting the flow of migrants/refugees and increasing border controls

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| ALWAYS EFFECTIVE | 269 | 32.0 | 32.3 | 32.3 |
| MOSTLY EFFECTIVE | 290 | 34.5 | 34.8 | 67.1 |
| RARELY EFFECTIVE | 146 | 17.5 | 17.6 | 84.7 |
| NEVER EFFECTIVE | 85 | 10.1 | 10.2 | 94.9 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 27 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 98.1 |
| REFUSE | 16 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 100.0 |
| Total | 832 | 99.2 | 100.0 | |

Q47. Blocking suspected terrorist financing

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| ALWAYS EFFECTIVE | 477 | 56.9 | 57.3 | 57.3 |
| MOSTLY EFFECTIVE | 272 | 32.5 | 32.7 | 90.1 |
| RARELY EFFECTIVE | 31 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 93.8 |
| NEVER EFFECTIVE | 24 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 96.7 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 12 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 98.2 |
| REFUSE | 15 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 100.0 |
| Total | 832 | 99.2 | 100.0 | |

Q48. We have two questions not related to foreign policy. Prior to this interview, had you ever heard of the Stockton Polling Institute?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| YES | 115 | 13.7 | 18.9 | 18.9 |
| NO | 475 | 56.6 | 77.8 | 96.6 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 9 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 98.0 |
| REFUSE | 12 | 1.4 | 2.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 610 | 72.8 | 100.0 | |

Q49. Have you ever heard of the William J. Hughes Center for Public Policy at Stockton University?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| YES | 99 | 11.8 | 16.2 | 16.2 |
| NO | 490 | 58.4 | 80.3 | 96.5 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 9 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 98.0 |
| REFUSE | 12 | 1.4 | 2.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 610 | 72.8 | 100.0 | |

Appendix B. Frequency Distributions for Demographic Data, Partisan Affiliation, and Ideology

PARTY. In politics today, do you consider yourself a:

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Republican | 191 | 22.8 | 23.0 | 23.0 |
| Democrat | 267 | 31.8 | 32.2 | 55.2 |
| An independent | 268 | 31.9 | 32.3 | 87.5 |
| Or something else? | 75 | 8.9 | 9.0 | 96.5 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 11 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 97.9 |
| REFUSE (VOL) | 18 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 100.0 |
| Total | 830 | 98.9 | 100.0 | |

IDEOLOGY. In general, would you describe your political views as:

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Very conservative | 37 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.4 |
| Conservative | 154 | 18.3 | 18.5 | 22.9 |
| Moderate | 331 | 39.4 | 39.9 | 62.8 |
| Liberal | 191 | 22.8 | 23.1 | 85.9 |
| Or very liberal? | 72 | 8.5 | 8.6 | 94.5 |
| OTHER | 13 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 96.1 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW (VOL) | 11 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 97.5 |
| REFUSE (VOL) | 21 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 100.0 |
| Total | 830 | 98.9 | 100.0 | |

D1. Which category describes your age?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| 18 to 29 | 102 | 12.1 | 12.2 | 12.2 |
| 30 to 49 | 231 | 27.5 | 27.8 | 40.0 |
| 50 to 64 | 266 | 31.7 | 32.0 | 72.0 |
| Or 65 and older? | 219 | 26.1 | 26.3 | 98.3 |
| REFUSE (VOL) | 14 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 100.0 |
| Total | 831 | 99.0 | 100.0 | |

D2. Do you consider yourself to be Hispanic or Latino, or not?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-----|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| YES | 75 | 8.9 | 9.0 | 9.0 |
| NO | 737 | 87.9 | 88.8 | 97.9 |

| | | | | |
|---------------------|-----|------|-------|-------|
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW | 1 | .1 | .1 | 98.0 |
| REFUSE | 17 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 830 | 98.9 | 100.0 | |

D3. Which of the following best represents your race:

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| White | 630 | 75.1 | 75.9 | 75.9 |
| Black or African American | 69 | 8.2 | 8.3 | 84.2 |
| Asian or Pacific Native American | 33 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 88.3 |
| Or do you identify with more than one race? | 4 | .5 | .5 | 88.8 |
| OTHER (VOL) | 49 | 5.9 | 5.9 | 94.7 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW (VOL) | 13 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 96.2 |
| REFUSE (VOL) | 3 | .4 | .4 | 96.6 |
| Total | 28 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 100.0 |
| | 830 | 98.9 | 100.0 | |

D4. Which of the following best describes your highest level of education?

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Did not graduate from high school | 24 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 |
| High school graduate | 110 | 13.1 | 13.2 | 16.1 |
| Some college | 217 | 25.9 | 26.2 | 42.3 |
| A four-year college degree | 224 | 26.6 | 26.9 | 69.2 |
| Or a graduate degree | 241 | 28.7 | 29.0 | 98.2 |
| REFUSE (VOL) | 15 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 100.0 |
| Total | 830 | 98.9 | 100.0 | |

D5. Which of the following general categories best represents your household income last year before taxes:

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Less than \$25,000 | 58 | 6.9 | 7.0 | 7.0 |
| \$25,000 to less than \$50,000 | 94 | 11.2 | 11.3 | 18.3 |
| \$50,000 to less than \$100,000 | 221 | 26.4 | 26.7 | 44.9 |

| | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----|------|-------|-------|
| \$100,000 to \$150,000 | 164 | 19.5 | 19.7 | 64.7 |
| Or more than \$150,000? | 188 | 22.4 | 22.6 | 87.3 |
| NOT SURE/DON'T KNOW (VOL) | 22 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 89.9 |
| REFUSE (VOL) | 84 | 10.0 | 10.1 | 100.0 |
| Total | 830 | 98.9 | 100.0 | |

D6. I'm required to verify. Are you a:

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-----------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Male | 417 | 49.7 | 50.2 | 50.2 |
| Or female | 413 | 49.2 | 49.8 | 100.0 |
| Total | 830 | 98.9 | 100.0 | |

Appendix C. Complete Content Analysis for Foreign Policy Strategies and Party Platforms

| Foreign Policy Strategy | Democratic Platform | GOP Platform | Difference in Attitudes |
|--|--|--|-------------------------------|
| Maintaining alliances with other countries | Yes: “”; “global network of alliances is...a source of tremendous strategic advantage”; laments “strained alliances” under Bush and praises repairing alliances under Obama; “believe in strong alliances”; | Yes but with limits: “Avoid...unnecessary alliances”; recognizes specific alliances throughout text; “we must...rebuild relationships with our allies, who understand that...they do not need to engage in nuclear proliferation.” | Favored by Democrats (+18.5%) |
| Maintaining U.S. military superiority | No mentions | Yes: military superiority identified as “cornerstone of a strategy...”; “rebuild troop numbers and readiness”; calls for “Reagan-era force that can fight and win 2 ½ wars ranging from counterterrorism to deterring major power aggressors.”; explicit mentions of: defense system, modernizing nuclear weapons & delivery systems; criticizes 25% cut in real dollars in defense budget. | Favored by Republicans (+15%) |
| Negotiating international treaties | Yes, “fulfill, honor, and strengthen to the highest extent possible...treaties”; criticizes “abandon(ing) our treaty allies” | Focuses on perils of doing so, instead of promises: “we...oppose adoption or ratification of treaties that would weaken or encroach upon American sovereignty” | Favored by Democrats (+20.5%) |
| Placing economic sanctions on other countries | Yes, for Iran (“if necessary”) and North Korea | Yes to use them against Russia, No to lifting Iranian sanctions; No to lifting Cuban sanctions without specific conditions being met first | No significant difference |
| Strengthening the United Nations⁷⁸ | Yes, for ratification of Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; UN described as “amplifier of American strength and influence” with general statement on needed reforms | No- supports amendment to reject interference from UN, reserves right to “go its own way”; rejects following UN treaties: UN Convention on Women’s Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), and “various declarations”; rejects Agenda 21, jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court; specifically criticizes UN in variety of areas (overpaid bureaucrats, inclusion of human rights violators on Human Rights Council, managerial scandals, and U.N. Population Fund. | Favored by Democrats (+19.8%) |
| Providing economic | Yes, “development assistance is | Yes- “foreign aid must serve | Favored by |

⁷⁸ Source: Pew (2013) Q7.d

| | | | |
|---|---|--|-------------------------------------|
| <p>aid to other countries</p> | <p>essential instrument of American power. It can prevent threats, enhance stability, and reduce the need for military force.</p> | <p>America’s interests first”; cites Millenium Challenge Corporation (MCC) as model for aid; aid is to be used to “catalyze private sector investment and expertise” to “build a more stable world and advance America’s national security and economic interests”; seeks to lift limits on some faith-based aid organizations</p> | <p>Democrats (+17.1%)</p> |
| <p>Providing military aid to other countries</p> | <p>No explicit mention of military aid</p> | <p>No explicit mention of military aid</p> | <p>Favored by Democrats (+7.2%)</p> |