

RESEARCH BRIEF

*Biographical Profiles, Political
Ambition, and Legislative
Professionalization*

August 2013

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


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List of Abbreviations

- 1) Previous Elective Office - *PEO*
- 2) Previous Assembly Office - *PAO*
- 3) Sought Higher Office - *SHO*
- 4) Current Leadership Position - *CLP*
- 5) Pre-Senate Leadership Position - *PSLP*
- 6) Recruited Vacant Seat - *RVS*
- 7) Link PEO+CLP - *LPC*
- 8) Link PAO+PSLP - *LPP*
- 9) Link (PAO+PSLP) +CLP - *LPPC*
- 10) Bounded Ambition - *BA*
- 11) General Assembly - *GA*
- 12) Political Opportunity Structures - *POS*
- 13) Leadership Opportunity Structures - *LOS*
- 14) Rating1-Official Website - *R1-OW*
- 15) Rating2-Official & Partisan Website - *R2-OPW*
- 16) Least Professionalized – *LP*
- 17) Average Professionalism – *AP*
- 18) Most Professionalized - *MP*

Section One: Executive Summary

The study analyzes the linkages between the biographical/demographic profiles of members of the New Jersey Legislature, the varieties of political ambition, and legislative professionalization. Interested citizens who access official and partisan websites to procure biographical information on their legislators will find wide disparities in the user-friendliness of online sources. The study constructed a user-friendliness index to evaluate both official and partisan websites and found that user-friendliness scores increase as the level of legislative professionalization in a state increases. New Jersey has one of the most professionalized legislatures in the country. Citizens of the Garden State will generally have a better online experience accessing these websites than citizens of states with less professionalized legislatures. The New Jersey Legislature is also ranked nationally in terms of certain demographic characteristics, like legislators with advanced degrees and the representation of women in the Legislature. A substantial majority of the state's legislators have diverse backgrounds; 60% have one or more of the following characteristics - being born, educated, or employed outside New Jersey. Much of the biographical information on official and partisan websites is the product of self-reporting by New Jersey legislators. This enables officeholders the latitude to determine the level of self-disclosure with which they are comfortable. In terms of religious participation, New Jersey legislators are notably reticent to disclose information about their religiosity, though members of the Senate (22.5%) are more inclined to do so than members of the General Assembly (12.5%).

In terms of political ambition the study distinguishes between progressive ambition (seeking higher elective office) and intra-institutional ambition (seeking

leadership positions). Conceptual distinctions are also drawn between three different types of progressive ambition - seeking higher office into a legislature, seeking higher office within a legislature (from a lower to an upper chamber), and leaving a legislative seat to seek higher office (e.g. Congress). The study finds that political ambition is not distributed evenly across a legislature or within its chambers, though members of the majority party tend to exhibit higher levels of progressive and intra-institutional ambition. However, the partisan differentials diminish, are eliminated, or even favor the minority party when the linkages between the two types of political ambition are considered. The study also coined another type of political ambition "Bounded Ambition," as the product of the mediating effects of two institutional features of the New Jersey Legislature - i.e., the role that party organizations play in recruiting candidates for vacant legislative seats and the range of leadership opportunity structures (LOS) that enable legislators to develop their intra-institutional ambition. The implications of analyzing these linkages among the varieties of political ambition suggest several hypotheses for further testing about how progressive and intra-institutional ambition contribute to the level of legislative professionalization in a state legislature.

Section Two: Introduction

The mission statement of William J. Hughes Center for Public Policy identifies one of its key functions as conducting research projects that educate the citizenry on civic engagement. An important predicate to efficacious civic engagement is being properly informed not just on issues of public import but also on the guardians of the public trust. The instantaneous and round-the-clock coverage of controversial political

issues and personalities, by mainstream and non-traditional media outlets, often fails to provide voters the requisite information they seek about their own elected officials and the legislative bodies from which they govern.

An axiom of American politics is that elections are "candidate-centered," because voters are often better informed about a candidate's personal biography than their policy prescriptions. Nonetheless, interested citizens must often incur significant opportunity costs if they wish to procure biographical information on their particular elected officials and the legislative bodies in which they serve. When New Jersey voters cast their ballots they are electing not just their particular representative, but also a member of a legislative body with its own biographical and demographic profiles. A number of internet and reference resources provide such profiles for individual legislators and for legislative bodies. These data are quite useful for ascertaining the credentials of a legislator, like previous electoral and leadership experiences, sponsored legislation, committee assignments, as well biographical information on place of birth, gender, education, employment, and the like. Some of these data are aggregated so that interested citizens can compare their legislature with those of other states.

What is not readily available, at the individual or aggregated level, is information about the political ambitions of politicians, or their commitment to public service. The present study is a modest contribution to understanding the varieties of political ambition that animate the electoral careers of New Jersey legislators. It utilizes biographical and demographic data compiled from a variety of sources, i.e., official and partisan websites, www.votesmart.org and Fitzgerald's Manual for the 244th New Jersey Legislature, to develop a typology of political ambition (progressive, intra-

institutional, and bounded ambition). These sources present data at either the level of an individual legislator or for the legislature as a whole. The study consolidated biographical data from these disparate sources into a database to identify and analyze a series of patterns among New Jersey legislators in terms of their biographical and demographic profiles, and the types of political ambition that shape their electoral careers. In addition to providing New Jerseyans analytic information on the biographical profiles of their legislators, the study also identifies linkages between biographical profiles, political ambition, and legislative professionalization that may be of interest to students of legislative politics.

The New Jersey Legislature is among the most professionalized in the country. An area of research that warrants ongoing and systematic attention is the relationship between New Jersey's level of legislative professionalism and the biographic profiles of New Jersey legislators (including the varieties of political ambition identified herein).

The study proceeds through several stages of analysis. The first (Section Three) reviews the concept of political ambition and embraces the view that a more nuanced conceptual framework is necessary. Political scientists typically focus on progressive ambition (seeking higher office) as the quintessential form of political ambition, but also acknowledge a distinct form of ambition, the pursuit of leadership positions within a legislative body, i.e., intra-institutional ambition (Herrick & Moore, 1993). Moreover, the study argues that researchers should make conceptual distinctions between the three following types of progressive ambition: 1) seeking higher office by election into a legislature; 2) seeking higher office within a legislature, e.g. from the New Jersey General Assembly to the Senate; and 3) leaving the legislature for a higher office, e.g.

Congress. The study analyzes these types of progressive ambition as well as their linkages to intra-institutional ambition (Section Six). Additionally, the implications of these linkages point to hypotheses on how progressive and intra-institutional ambition contribute to legislative professionalization (Section Seven). The study undertakes two preliminary steps before proceeding to the analyses of political ambition. The first is to create an index to score the user-friendliness of official and partisan websites that contain biographical profiles of New Jersey legislators and to relate those scores to legislative professionalization (Section Four). The second is to focus on certain biographic and demographic features of New Jersey legislators and to link those findings to legislative professionalization (Section Five).

Section Three: Varieties of Political Ambition


Ambition is one of those paradoxical phenomena that simultaneously intrigues and perplexes moral and political philosophers, theologians, novelists, and social scientists. It is described as both a vice (even the embodiment of Satan) and as indispensable feature of American political culture (King, 2013; Sokolow, 1989). James Madison's oft-quoted aphorism in Federalist #51 (p.323) about the imperative of enabling ambition to counteract ambitionⁱ underscores the social utility of political ambition. A democracy relies on ambition as an effective means of representing the vast diversity of interests. To preclude any constellation of interests from becoming too powerful, certain institutional structures (e.g. separation of powers and concurrent authority) can mediate the otherwise adverse effects of unbridled ambition by ensuring that interests have no choice but to negotiate and compromise with other mobilized

interests. Managing the ambition of particular interests can therefore serve the broader public interest, while enhancing the openness and stability of a polity.

Observers of political ambition have largely worked within a typology advanced by Joseph Schlesinger in 1966, which posits three classifications of ambition (discrete, static, and progressive) . The first is associated with citizen-legislators who view public service as an episodic expression of civic duty; their desire for elective office has clear temporal parameters, serving for perhaps one or two terms. The second category refers to public servants with a more indefinite time-line, though they wish to pursue and hold on to a particular office. The third category (and the subject of much of the present study) is progressive ambition. According to Schlesinger's typology it refers to politicians who view their electoral career as a trajectory of seeking progressively higher offices.

A useful revision of Schlesinger's typology is a distinction between progressive ambition and intra-institutional ambition. While the former is "office-seeking" the latter is "position-seeking" i.e., leadership positions (Herrick and Moore, 1993). The authors argue that because ambition affects the political behavior of politicians (e.g. staff resources, legislative agenda, policy specialization, party discipline) it is necessary to distinguish between the pursuit of higher office (progressive ambition) from the aspiration to become a leader within a legislative body (intra-institutional ambition)(see also, Soule, John, 1969). The present study proceeds from this distinction and places particular emphasis on the linkages between the different types of progressive and intra-institutional ambition (Diagram #1). The implications of those linkages are incorporated into hypotheses about how political ambition and legislative biographies contribute to legislative professionalization.

Diagram #1: Varieties of Political Ambition



Section Four: Legislative Biographies & Legislative Professionalization

The study analyzed websites in all fifty states in terms of the quality and accessibility (or user-friendliness) of biographical information on state legislators. Each state maintains a government-operated website (hereinafter, official website) that contains biographic profiles of its legislators. Legislative websites are also sponsored and maintained by the Democratic and Republican parties (hereinafter, partisan websites) that supplement, duplicate, or generally enhance the quality and accessibility of the biographic profiles in the official websites. In some states the user-friendliness of official websites is superior to the accessibility of partisan websites.

Partisan websites can be located through a variety of search terms such as "state legislature," which point to both official and partisan websites. Partisan websites are typically constructed for each chamber of a legislature; interested citizens can therefore access biographical profile for House Democrats, House Republicans, Senate

Democrats, and Senate Republicans. They also tend to be somewhat less user-friendly than official websites and often require more specific iterations of general search terms, such as "state senate minority" or "state house GOP." The additional effort, however, can yield some dividends by enhancing the biographic profiles from the official websites.

Partisan websites certainly include information on the trajectory of a legislator's political career, but they also emphasize legislative activity such as sponsored and co-sponsored bills and committee assignments. Some partisan websites also provide links to the personal web pages of legislators, which generally replicate the biographic profiles in the official websites. Interested citizens need to cull these websites rather extensively to find substantive information on a legislator's motivations and ambitions regarding their commitment to public service.

The study developed two ratings for each state based on the quality and accessibility of biographical profiles in both official and partisan websites (Appendix A). The first rating evaluates each state's official website (R1-OW) exclusively; the second is an overall rating that incorporates both official and partisan websites (R2-OPW). The criteria utilized to rate both R1-OW and R2-OPW websites was twofold. The first assessed the comprehensiveness of their legislative biographies, which include personal and family background, employment history, educational credentials, civic engagement commitments, previous elective office, and current legislative activity. These legislative profiles convey to interested citizens, explicitly but more often implicitly, a sense of the motivations and ambitions that anchor a legislator's commitment to public service.

Second, the websites were evaluated in terms of their user-friendliness. A rating scale for both official and partisan websites was established to score the websites from 1 to 5, wherein a 1 means a particular website is the least user-friendly and a 5 connotes that it is the most user-friendly. The study initially assigned all websites a rating of 5, but points were subsequently deducted if locating legislative biographies

became increasingly difficult. Websites were deducted points if interested citizens needed to click multiple tabs on an official or partisan website in order to access legislative biographies. Websites assigned the lowest rating of 1 have little to no biographical information, or their content is exceedingly difficult to navigate. Conversely, websites with the highest rating (5) have comprehensive biographies that are readily accessible.

As noted earlier, the initial set of ratings (R1-OW) pertains specifically to official websites and the second (R2-OPW) is an overall rating for both official and partisan websites. Presumably, interested citizens who seek biographical profiles of their legislators are more inclined to access official websites than those provided by political parties. However, partisan websites do not merely replicate the content of official websites. The former usually enhance the comprehensiveness of the latter, and improve the overall rating for particular states by at least 1 point.

As Appendix A indicates, the average R1-OW score for official websites is 2.16 and it is 2.56 for R2-OPW websites. These scores suggest that interested citizens can construct a somewhat more comprehensive biographic profile of legislators by utilizing both official and partisan websites. Second, that both averages are fairly low - less than 3 on a 5 point scale - means the user-friendliness of both official and partisan websites is generally less than exemplary. Moreover, the low average suggests the possibility that a substantial divergence exists among the various states in terms of the user-friendliness of their official and partisan websites. Appendix A also indicates that a very high proportion of official websites rank as either a 1 or 2, for a total of 37 or 74% of all states. Only three states achieved a ranking above 3 for their official websites, and those were all ranked as a 4. The addition of partisan websites markedly improved the overall user-friendliness of a state's legislative profiles. The proportion of states with a ranking lower than a 3 decreased from 74% to 58% with the addition of partisan websites. In contrast to the R1-OW scores, there are 3 states with a ranking of 5 in the

R2-OPW category. The fact that a majority of R2-OPW scores are still below a 3 suggests that, generally speaking, there is room for improving the user-friendliness of both official and partisan websites, particularly the ease with which interested citizens can readily obtain online information about their legislator's biographic profile.

An interesting question is whether the varying degrees of user-friendliness of official and partisan websites are associated with the level of professionalism among state legislatures. Scholars of state politics have devoted significant intellectual resources to the conceptualization and measurement of legislative professionalism (Maddox, 2004). The commonality among the various approaches is reflected in The National Conference of State Legislatures's (NCSL) own definition of legislative professionalism which focuses on the percentage of work-time legislators devote to their elective offices, their level of compensation, and the relative level of staff resources.ⁱⁱ The NCSL uses a color scheme to categorize the level of professionalism in each state. Blue is assigned to states that are herein re-categorized as the "Least Professionalized" (LP); White corresponds to states of "Average Professionalism: (AP); and Red refers to the "Most Professionalized (MP) legislatures. NCSL further divides the Red and Blue states into a lighter hue of each color; but the present study collapses those distinctions and replaces the color scheme with the LP, AP, and MP categories. There are 17 states that are among the least professionalized (LP); 23 are of average professionalism (AP); and 10 among the most professionalized (MP).

An intuitively appealing hypothesis to test is whether higher levels of professionalism among the various legislatures are associated with higher R1-OW and R2-OPW scores. The R1-OW scores of official websites confirm the hypothesis. The average score for the least professionalized (LP) states is 1.88 on the five-point scale; for states with average professionalism (AP) it is 2.13, and for the most professionalized (MP) legislatures the average score is 2.7. The inclusion of partisan websites generally improved the overall (R2-OPW) rating of biographic profiles for each category of

legislative professionalism. For the LP and AP categories the overall rating increased to 2.35 with the addition of partisan websites. The average score for the MP states increased to 3.4. The correlation of user-friendliness scores with legislative professionalism means that interested citizens are more likely to improve their online searches for biographic profiles as the professionalism of their legislature increases. The New Jersey legislature is categorized by NCSL as one of the most professionalized in the country. The legislatures of the neighboring states of New York and Pennsylvania are also similarly categorized. However, while the official websites of New Jersey and Pennsylvania are assigned a relatively low score (2) for the user-friendliness of their official websites, New York earned a score of 4. The inclusion of partisan websites for these states increased the overall score by one point for each state, to 3 for the Garden State, 3 for the Keystone State, and 5 for the Empire State.

Implications

As interested citizens peruse official and partisan websites to glean information about their legislators' biographic profiles it is imperative that they remain cognizant that the mere exercise of accessing such (online) information differs from one state to the other, in terms of the user-friendliness of both official and partisan websites. A less apparent fact to casual online users is that the level of legislative professionalism also varies considerably across the country, and as the study has established a correlation exists between the user-friendliness of official and partisan websites and where a state is placed on the continuum of legislative professionalization, from least to most professionalized. Thus, the first implication of the present study is that the quality and ease of the online experience - in gathering biographical profiles of legislators - will generally improve for citizens as the level of legislative professionalism in their state increases.

The focus thus far has been on the general features of the online experience for citizens interested in constructing biographical profiles of their legislators, in terms of the types of websites that are available (official and partisan), their user-friendliness (R1-OW and R2-OPW scores), and the relationship of those scores to legislative professionalism. The following section narrows the focus to the New Jersey Legislature and outlines some of the demographic features of the General Assembly and Senate. The penultimate section analyzes the different types of political ambition that can be gleaned from legislative biographies.

Section Five: Demography & Legislative Biography

In addition to the official and partisan websites, interested citizens can utilize other online and print resources to construct demographic profiles of New Jersey legislators. The study incorporated data from official and partisan websites, www.votesmart.org, and Fitzgerald's Manual for the 244th Legislature into a database to analyze some key demographic dimensions of the Legislature's membership, including education, gender, birthplace, Jersey-Centeredness, and religious participation.

Education

Data compiled by NCSL in 2009 indicate that the New Jersey Legislature has an impressive level of highly educated lawmakers. Nationally, the state ranks ninth, seventh, and sixth, in terms of the percentage of legislators who hold a masters degree, a law degree, or a doctorate, respectively. Conversely, a considerably lower percentage of New Jersey legislators have only a high school degree (2.5%), some college (10%),

an associate degree (1.67%), or a bachelor's degree (20%). New Jersey is in the bottom quintile of national rankings in the percentage of legislators for whom the highest level of education attained is an associate degree (41st) or a bachelor's degree (48th). This means a sizable proportion of New Jersey legislators have a post-baccalaureate education. Indeed, a notable majority (58.3%) of New Jersey legislators hold some form of post-graduate degree (e.g., master's, law, or doctoral degrees). In contrast, only about one-third of Pennsylvania legislators have advanced degrees (36.1%), whereas 52.1% of New York legislators are similarly educated. Nationally, these percentages place New Jersey second only to Virginia (61.6%) in the proportion of legislators holding advanced degrees, while New York ranks sixth and Pennsylvania is 29th.

New Jersey ranks in the top quintile for all three categories of advanced degrees (MA-9th; JD-7th; Doc.-6th). There is only one type of post-graduate degree in which either Pennsylvania or New York occupies a national ranking in the top quintile. That position is held by New York (7th) in the proportion of legislators with law degrees; New Jersey is fifth while Pennsylvania is 11th. In terms of a master's degrees, Pennsylvania is 49th while New Jersey ranks 9th and New York is 17th. Both the Empire State (50th) and the Keystone State (43rd) are in the bottom quintile nationally for legislators with doctorates. Another interesting distinction between New Jersey and its two neighboring states is that the highest proportion of educational attainment, or that category's statistical mode, for New Jersey legislators is a law degree (26.7%), whereas in Pennsylvania and New York it is a bachelor's degree (38.5% and 31.7%, respectively).

The referent for the data analyses on educational attainment is the New Jersey legislature as a body, but these data shroud distinctions between the General Assembly and the Senate. Moreover, the NCSL data were compiled in 2009. The data for the intra-body comparisons below are drawn from Fitzgerald's 2011 Legislative Manual for New Jersey (2nd session of the 244th Legislature) and www.votesmart.org. Though these data cover a later legislative session than NCSL's data, significant shifts in the demographic profile of legislators are generally not expected within the span of two election cycles. For instance, the NCSL data indicate that 58.34% of New Jersey legislators held advanced degrees in 2009. Two years later that marker was three percentage points higher according to the Fitzgerald manual and the votesmart.org data.

In regard to educational attainment, the two chambers of the New Jersey Legislature have markedly distinct profiles. While 53.75% of the Assembly's legislators hold post-graduate degrees, three-quarters of New Jersey state senators hold an MA, JD, or Doctorate. The fact that the upper chamber has a significantly higher proportion of legislators with advanced degrees, in comparison to the Assembly, is not immediately apparent to the public because demographic data are typically aggregated for the entire legislature (NCSL), or dis-aggregated at the individual level (votesmart.org).

Another example that highlights the utility of dis-aggregating biographical data according to legislative chamber is the number of New Jersey legislators who hold joint MA/JD degrees (7). Though this cohort comprises only 5.8% of the entire legislature, members who hold this particular joint degree are 4 times more likely to be in the Senate than in the Assembly. The latter has a higher proportion of legislators for whom

a law degree is the highest level of educational attainment than is true for the Senate (25% and 17.5%, respectively). The New Jersey legislature has only two members with a Ph.D. and both are in the General Assembly.

Gender

There are other interesting, biographical dimensions for which the differences between the two legislative chambers are at least five percentage points (gender and birthplace). In terms of the former, there is higher proportion of female legislators in the New Jersey Assembly (30%) than in the Senate (25%). The total proportion of women in the 244th Legislature was 28.3%. More recent data from the National Council of State Legislatures indicate a slight increase in 2013 to 29.2%; that means New Jersey is ranked 11th nationally in the percentage of female legislators. The neighboring states of New York (22.1%) and Pennsylvania (17.8%) both have markedly lower proportions of women serving in their state legislatures. New Jersey also fares better than the national average of 24.2%, and is significantly higher than the share of women in the 113th Congress (18.3%), according to data compiled by the Rutgers University's Center for American Women and Politics.ⁱⁱⁱ While the proportion of female legislators in New Jersey is significantly lower than the percentage of women in the Garden State (51.3%),^{iv} there is a much higher level of descriptive representation than is the case in neighboring states, the average for state female legislators nationally, and the proportion of women in the US Congress.

Birthplace & Jersey-Centeredness

There is also a 5 percentage point differential between the two legislative bodies in terms of the proportion of legislators for whom New Jersey is not their birthplace. The Senate has a higher percentage of legislators born outside New Jersey (27.5%) than the General Assembly (22.5%). Although the birthplace of New Jersey legislators is not causally related to their political ambitions or legislative records it can, along with other factors, be a marker of how "Jersey-Centered" they are from a purely biographical standpoint. Interested citizens can construct an index of Jersey-Centeredness for all legislators by coding data in their biographical profiles under the general rubric of Significant-Out-of-State-Experiences (SOSE). The particular types of data for the SOSE index are whether a New Jersey legislator was: 1) born outside of New Jersey; 2) educated at a college or university outside the state; and/or 3) meaningfully employed in another state at some point in their career. The index of Jersey-Centeredness is inversely related to the number of identifiers in a legislator's biographical profile; i.e., as the number of SOSE identifiers decreases the degree of Jersey-Centeredness increases. The most Jersey-Centric legislators therefore have no SOSE identifiers. Overall, 60% of all state legislators have one or more of the three SOSE indicators.

A more nuanced picture emerges when the SOSE identifiers are considered separately for each of the two chambers. While 62.5% of the Senate's roster has one or more SOSE identifiers, 58.75% of the Assembly's membership shares a similar background. New Jersey state senators are therefore somewhat less Jersey-centric than their counterparts in the Assembly. However, the SOSE cohort in the Assembly represents a broader range of SOSE values than is the case with the Senate. A higher proportion of the Assembly (SOSE) cohort has **one** out-of-state experience than is true for its Senate counterpart, 53.2% and 36%, respectively. But a much higher percentage of the Senate cohort has **two** out-of-state indicators, 64% compared to 40.4% in the

Assembly SOSE cohort. Finally, while no members of the Senate cohort have **three** out-of-state experiences, 6.4% of the Assembly SOSE cohort does. The SOSE cohort in the Assembly therefore displays more breadth than its Senate counterpart, in terms of representing the range of SOSE identifiers. In contrast, the Senate has a higher overall proportion of SOSE legislators, but all members of that cohort have either only one or two SOSE markers. Thus, the Assembly cohort has more **breadth** while the Senate cohort has more **depth**. Indeed, in two of the three identifiers the percentage differential between the Assembly and the Senate favors the former. The largest differential, however, favors the Senate (two SOSE identifiers) by 24.4 percentage points.

An interesting inquiry for further research is whether a relationship of correlation (as opposed to causation) indeed exists across the legislatures of the 50 states between the SOSE index and the various types of political ambition analyzed in the present study. In this regard, the hypothesis is whether legislators across the country with higher SOSE scores are more inclined to focus on promoting policy agendas, as opposed to advancing the more parochial interests of their constituents?

Religious Participation

Much of the biographical data to which the public has ready access is generally compiled from information provided by legislators through self-reporting. This procedure offers an interesting insight into the features of self-representation that legislators wish to reveal to constituents. An example of such a feature is whether a legislator is an active person of faith. Presumably, the number of legislators who willingly reveal their religious identity and participation exceeds the actual number of legislators who are persons of faith. The proportion of Assembly legislators who

willingly disclose some form of religious participation is almost double the percentage of senators who are similarly inclined, 22.5% and 12.5%, respectively. This low level of religious self-reporting is not an accurate representation of the actual level of religiosity among New Jersey legislators. Citizens should therefore only assume that the dearth of information in the biographical profiles is a function of legislator's predispositions toward this form of personal disclosure rather than a true measure of their piety.

Implications

The biographical profiles of New Jersey legislators are useful for two purposes. The first is that they highlight four clearly discernible demographic characteristics of the Legislature's membership. Second, the profiles have analytic value in formulating hypotheses for testing in future research. First, members of the Assembly and Senate are highly educated; the latter even more so than the former particularly in terms of advanced degrees. The New Jersey Legislature ranks in the top quintile nationally in terms of post-graduate degrees, and has a higher level of formal education than the legislatures of Pennsylvania and New York. The fact that New Jersey is also among the most professionalized (MP) legislatures suggests a correlation may exist between aggregate levels of formal education and the degree of legislative professionalism. Thus, a hypothesis for further testing, across the legislatures of all 50 states, is whether the aggregate level of educational attainment increases with higher levels of legislative professionalism.

The second characteristic is that the New Jersey Legislature is progressive in terms of the descriptive representation of women in the Assembly and Senate. Although less

than one-third (28.3%) of the 244th Legislature were women, the state fares better than the neighboring states of Pennsylvania and New York, the national average for state legislatures, and the US Congress in terms of the proportion of female legislators. In a manner similar to educational attainment, a hypothesis for further inquiry is whether the representation of women increases with higher levels of legislative professionalism. The New Jersey Legislature is certainly one instance in which a positive correlation exists between these two variables.

The third characteristic is that a notable majority (60%) of New Jersey's legislators have at least one significant out-of-state experience (SOSE) in their biographical profiles. The SOSE index is higher for members of the New Jersey Senate than the General Assembly, which means that the latter chamber is more Jersey-Centric from a strictly biographical perspective. That the Assembly is more Jersey-Centric than the Senate begs the question of whether Jersey-Centeredness correlates with differences in legislative behavior and leadership styles. Thus, a hypothesis for further inquiry is whether legislators with deeper biographical roots in the state are more inclined to pursue constituent service rather than issue advocacy.

The fourth characteristic is that New Jersey legislators are possibly quite intentional in how much biographical information they wish to disclose. Religious participation is an excellent case in point. Slightly more than one-fifth (22.5%) of the New Jersey Assembly and just 12.5 % of the Senate self-reported any religious participation. An immediate conclusion interested citizens may draw from these figures is that members of the New Jersey Legislature are overwhelmingly secular in orientation. However, a more plausible explanation is simply that the low levels of

disclosure about religious participation reflect a political calculus by legislators that they should err on the side of less - rather than more - disclosure about their religiosity. The New Jersey data suggest that members of the lower chamber afford themselves more latitude in disclosing their religious inclinations than is the case for the upper chamber. An interesting hypothesis for further testing is to establish whether, in states with bicameral legislatures, New Jersey legislators are representative of a broader national pattern in which senators are less expansive in disclosing their religious participation than legislators in the lower chambers. Another hypothesis is to test whether willingness to disclose biographical information on religiosity is inversely related to levels of legislative professionalism.

The second implication of the present study is that higher levels of legislative professionalization may attract prospective officeholders with the sort of biographical profiles that give the New Jersey Legislature high national rankings in certain demographic characteristics. The hypotheses outlined in this section are designed to test this implication through further research.

In addition to demographic characteristics, the biographical profiles in the readily available sources (official & partisan websites, votesmart.org, and Fitzgerald's Manual), also provide a wealth of information that enable interested citizens to learn a great deal about the political ambitions of New Jersey Legislators. An analysis of the various types of ambition outlined earlier is developed in the next section.

Section Six: Political Ambition & Legislative Biography

As noted at the outset, an indicator of progressive ambition is whether a legislator's political career proceeds along a trajectory of successively higher elective offices. There are two levels at which this marker can be manifested. At the first level, progressive ambition (*PEO - Previous Elective Office*) is ascribed to members of the New Jersey Assembly and Senate if their first elective office was attained before entering the state legislature - primarily in local, municipal, and county government. The study analyzes *PEO* legislators from four vantage points: 1) as a cohort, 2) as Democrats and Republicans, 3) as a proportion within the entire legislature, and 4) as a percentage of the two respective chambers. The second level of progressive ambition (*PAO-Previous Assembly Office*) is specific to NJ state senators whose first elective office was outside the New Jersey Legislature, and who subsequently served in the General Assembly before becoming a senator. The study distinguishes a third level of progressive ambition (*SHO-Sought Higher Office*); it refers to members of the 244th legislature who were (unsuccessful) candidates for higher office in either statewide or federal elections.

The study also coins a new category of political ambition, referred to herein as "Bounded Ambition" (*BA*). It is the product of the mediating effects of two intervening variables on the linkages between progressive (*PEO*, *PAO*, and *SHO*) and intra-institutional (*CLP* and *PSLP*) ambition. The notion of "bounded ambition" is a variation on Herbert Simon's idea of bounded rationality, which stipulates that rational decision-making, particularly within organizations, is often less than optimal because it is invariably mediated by the limitations of imperfect knowledge, cognitive abilities, and

logistical constraints (Jones, 2002). The underlying assumption is that decision-making processes are not reducible to mere inputs and outputs. Instead, rationality is mediated by internal and external factors. In a similar manner, the manifestations of political ambition are not merely reducible to a legislator's aspiration for elective office or a leadership position. The varieties of political ambition are mediated by internal and external factors like being part of the minority party, being recruited by the party hierarchy for a vacant seat (*RVS-Recruited Vacant Seat*), and the availability of leadership positions within a particular legislative chamber (*LOS-Leadership Opportunity Structures*). In the context of the present study, bounded ambition is the product of the mediating effects of these factors on linkages between progressive and intra-institutional ambition.

The importance of identifying and analyzing bounded ambition is twofold. First, it underscores the fact that political ambition cannot be understood simply as an endogenous feature of a legislator's aspirations for public service. For instance, if legislators partially owe their legislative seat to the party hierarchy that selected them to stand as a candidate for a vacant seat they may be somewhat reticent to exhibit the third type of progressive ambition (*SHO-Sought Higher Office*). Second, two types of intra-institutional ambition (*CLP-Current Leadership Position* and *PSLP-Pre-Senate Leadership Position*) are mediated by the range of opportunities to occupy leadership positions and serve on legislative committees. The notion of bounded ambition is therefore comprised of the exogenous influences (or, mediating effects) on political and intra-institutional ambition by two intervening variables, the recruitment of legislators by

the respective parties (*RVS-Recruited Vacant Seat*) and the structure of leadership opportunities (*LOS*).

Level One: Progressive Ambition (PEO & PAO)

A clear majority (72 or 60%) of New Jersey legislators belong to the first level of progressive ambition (*PEO-Previous Elective Office*). Almost two-thirds (63.9%) of this legislative cohort is in the Assembly, while 36.1% is in the Senate. The distribution of *PEO* legislators is fairly consistent with the partisan makeup of the Legislature. As the majority party, Democrats account for 56.9% of all legislators with previous elective experience and 59.2% of the entire legislature; whereas Republicans represent 43.1% of all *PEO* legislators and comprise 40.8% of the legislature. The bi-cameral distribution of *PEO* legislators in Table #1 indicates that the largest proportions of *PEO* legislators, in both parties, are in the Assembly. That fact is certainly consistent with the relative size of the two chambers (80 members in the Assembly and 40 in the Senate).

Table #1: Distribution of PEO Legislators by Chamber & Party ID

<u>Chamber</u>	<u>#Legs.</u>	<u>%PEO.</u>	<u>Dems.</u>	<u>%PEO.</u>	<u>Repubs.</u>	<u>%PEO.</u>
Assembly	46	63.9%	26	36.10%	20	27.77%
Senate	26	36.1%	15	20.80%	11	15.27%
Total	72	100.0%	41	56.90%	31	43.04%

Multiple analytic methods can be employed to compare how Democrats and Republicans fare in relation to the various types of ambition in the study. As the majority party, Democrats enjoy a numeric and proportional advantage over their Republican colleagues in terms of their share of all *PEO* legislators. In the Assembly the differential is +8.3 percentage points in favor of Democrats, while in the Senate the advantage is +5.5 percentage points. Thus, the legislative profile with the highest likelihood among the 72 member *PEO* cohort is that of an Assembly Democrat (a 36.1

percent chance); whereas the least likely profile is that of a Senate Republican, with only a 15.3 percent chance. However, for purposes of comparison across the various types of ambition included in the study, a more appropriate methodology is to compare the differentials between the two parties as a percentage of each legislative chamber's membership.

As Table #2 suggests, the intra-chamber (*PEO*) differentials in percentage points between the two parties favors Democrats by +7.5 points in the Assembly and +10 points in the Senate. Republicans, in both chambers are less likely than Democrats to have begun their political careers outside the legislature, but the differential is notably greater in the Senate than in the Assembly.

Table #2: PEO Legislators as Percentage of Chamber by Party ID

<u>Chamber</u>	<u># Legs.</u>	<u>%Cham.</u>	<u>Dems.</u>	<u>%Cham.</u>	<u>Repubs.</u>	<u>%Cham.</u>
Assembly	46	57.50%	26	32.50%	20	25.00%
Senate	26	65.00%	15	37.50%	11	27.50%
Total	72		41		31	

A key point of analytic interest throughout the remainder of the study is whether the advantage Democrats held in terms of *PEO* ambition applied to other types of ambition (*PAO*, *SHO*, *CLP*, *PSLP*, and *RVS*).

The second type of progressive ambition (*PAO-Previous Assembly Office*) applies specifically to senators who satisfy two criteria. The first is that they began their elective career outside the legislature (26 senators); the second refers to senators who previously served in the General Assembly (29 senators). The 244th Legislature had 19 senators (or 47.5% of the Senate) who met both criteria. This cohort of 19 *PAO* senators consists of 10 Democrats (25% of the Senate) and 9 Republicans (22.5% of all senators) (see Table #4). The intra-chamber (*PAO*) differential favors Senate

Democrats by 2.5 percentage points, which is considerably lower than the *PEO* advantage of 10 points for Senate Democrats.

The remainder of the Senate was comprised of:

- 1) 10 senators whose first elective office was in the (GA) General Assembly (*Not PEO/GA*); they are equally divided between Democrats and Republicans; and,
- 2) 11 senators who did not serve in Assembly, 7 of which were first elected outside the Legislature (*PEO/Not GA*) [5 Democrats and 2 Republicans] and 4 who held their first elective office in the Senate (*Not PAO/Sen*) [all Democrats].

There is almost virtual equality among the two parties among *PAO* and *Not PEO/GA* senators, but Democrats account for 9 of the 11 senators who are either *PEO/Not GA* or *Not PAO/Sen*. As the majority party, Democrats have more breadth and depth across the four cohorts outlined in Table #3. In contrast, Republicans are overwhelmingly clustered (87.5%) in the first two cohorts, whereas the *PAO* and *Not PEO/GA* categories account for a comparatively lower proportion of Senate Democrats (62.5%).

Table #3: Progressive Ambition (PAO): Senators First Elected Outside Legislature & Served in General Assembly

Category	No. of Sens.	%Sen.	Dems.	Repubs.
PAO Sens.	19	47.5	10	9
Not PEO/GA	10	25	5	5
PEO/Not GA	7	17.5	5	2
Not PAO/Sen.	4	10	4	0
Total	40	100.0	24	16

Table #4: PAO Senators by Party ID

Party ID	No:	%Senate
Democrats	10	25.00%
Republicans	9	22.50%
Total:	19	47.50%

Level Two: Intra-institutional Ambition (CLP-Current Leadership Position & PSLP-Pre-Senate Leadership Position)

A remarkably high proportion of the 244th Legislature's membership held leadership positions at some point during their tenure. Almost two-thirds (76 or 63.3%) of legislators held a leadership position in either chamber of the legislature (*CLP*). In the General Assembly it was 65% and 60% in the Senate. The proportion of leaders according to party identification reflects the status of the Democrats as the majority party in both chambers. Democratic leaders in the Assembly comprised 36.84% of all legislative leaders while 31.57% were Assembly Republicans. In the Senate, Democrats made up 19.73% of all legislative leaders, whereas Senate Republicans represented only 11.84% of all legislators with leadership positions (Table #5).

Table #5: Distribution of CLP Legislators by Chamber and Party ID

<u>Chamber</u>	<u>#Legs.</u>	<u>%CLP</u>	<u>Dems.</u>	<u>%CLP</u>	<u>Repubs.</u>	<u>%CLP</u>
Assembly	52	68.41%	28	36.84%	24	31.57%
Senate	24	31.57%	15	19.73%	9	11.84%
Total	76	99.98%	43	56.57%	33	43.41%

For comparative purposes, the intra-chamber differentials can be expressed as the proportion of each legislative chamber that is comprised of *CLP* legislators from each party. Distinctions among *CLP* legislators can also be expressed as percentage point differentials between the two parties. Table #6 indicates that the partisan differential favors Democrats by 5 points in the Assembly and 15 points in the Senate. While minority parties do not typically reach parity with the majority in the allocation of

leadership positions, Assembly Republicans are closer to parity with Democrats than Senate Republicans.

Table #6: CLP Legislators as Percentage of Chamber by Party ID

<u>Chamber</u>	<u>#Legs.</u>	<u>%Cham</u>	<u>Dems.</u>	<u>%Cham.</u>	<u>Repubs.</u>	<u>%Cham.</u>
Assembly	52	65.00%	28	35.00%	24	30.00%
Senate	24	60.00%	15	37.50%	9	22.50%
Total	76		43		33	

Democrats have a numeric and proportionate advantage for intra-institutional ambition (*CLP*) in both chambers. However, the advantage is three times as large, in percentage points, in the Senate as in the Assembly. Table #7 shows that the overall advantage for Democrats is larger for intra-institutional ambition (*CLP*-20 points) than it is for progressive ambition (*PEO*-17.5 points; *PAO*-2.5 points).

Table #7: Democratic Advantage for Progressive & Intra-Institutional Ambition

<u>Chamber</u>	<u>PEO</u>	<u>PAO</u>	<u>CLP</u>
Assembly	7.5	N/A	5.0
Senate	10.0	2.5	15.0

The *PAO* category applies only to the Senate and refers to senators whose first elective office was outside the legislature and who also served in the General Assembly before attaining their senate seat. The differential is only 2.5 percentage points in favor of Democrats. If *PAO* ambition is a marker of career-legislators, as opposed to citizen-legislators, Table #7 suggests that the New Jersey Senate holds particular appeal to legislators who view their commitment to elective office as an ongoing, as opposed to a short-term, exercise in civic duty.

The fact that Democrats, as the majority party, held an advantage in all three types of ambition, from a low of 2.5 percentage points to a high of 15 points, suggests

that political ambition may not simply be an endogenous feature of a legislator's predisposition, aspirations, and commitment to public service. There may also be exogenous factors within the institutional context in which ambition is exercised that reinforce the numeric and proportional advantages that accrue to the majority party in the two chambers of the New Jersey Legislature. These factors are explored further in the concluding portion of this section.

The second type of intra-institutional ambition (*PSLP-Pre-Senate Leadership Position*) applies specifically to senators who previously served in the General Assembly and held a leadership position therein. The *PSLP* cohort consists of 18 senators, or 45% of the Senate. The percentage point differentials that favored Democrats in terms of *PEO* and *CLP* ambition are not evident in the *PSLP* cohort. Indeed, it is comprised equally of (9) Democrats and (9) Republicans. The small differential (2.5 points) that favored Democrats in *PAO* ambition and the lack of any advantage in *PSLP* ambition suggests that if a hypothesized link exists between *PEO* and *CLP* ambition, the same may not be true for *PAO* and *PSLP* ambition. The confirmation of these two hypotheses is the subject of the following analyses.

Level Three: Progressive & Institutional Ambition: (Link-PEO + CLP [LPC])

The two previous levels analysis considered two types of progressive (*PEO* & *PAO*) and intra-institutional (*CLP* & *PSLP*) ambition separately. The initial focus herein is the nexus between these two types of political ambition among legislators generally, and then for members of the Assembly and Senate more specifically. Table #8 represents the distribution of all New Jersey legislators who exhibit both progressive (*PEO*) and intra-institutional (*CLP*) ambition. There are four variations of this particular linkage of ambition. The first is *NotPEO/NotCLP*, which applies to legislators whose first elective office was not outside the legislature and have not held a leadership position in

their respective chambers. Legislators who were not initially elected outside the legislature but who held leadership positions therein are characterized as *NotPEO/CLP*. Conversely, legislators whose first elective office preceded their legislative careers but have not held leadership positions fall under the *PEO/NotCLP* category. The cohort of particular interest to the study consists of legislators whose first elective office was outside the legislature and who held a leadership position therein. As Table #8 indicates, the *Link-PEO/CLP (LPC)* category accounts for the largest proportion of legislators overall, as well as within the two respective chambers.

The hypothesis that legislators who exhibit progressive ambition are also likely to pursue intra-institutional ambition can be tested with two different methodologies. The first is to compare the proportion of the New Jersey Legislature that is comprised of the following two cohorts: Cohort 1 - *PEO + CLP (LPC)* legislators and Cohort 2 - *NotPEO + CLP* legislators. The second approach is to identify the proportion of all *PEO* and *NotPEO* legislators who also exhibit intra-institutional ambition. In terms of the first test of the hypothesized nexus between the two types of ambition, Table #8 indicates there is a higher proportion of the New Jersey Legislature that is comprised of *PEO* legislators who also held a leadership position in their chamber (*PEO + CLP* - the *LPC* cohort) than the proportion of *NotPEO* legislators who also occupied a leadership office (*NotPEO + CLP*), 35.8% for Cohort 1 compared to 27.5% for Cohort 2. That 8.3 percentage point differential in favor of *PEO* legislators is even larger (13.2 points) when the two cohorts are compared as proportions of all legislative leaders. Cohort 1 comprises 56.6% of all leaders and Cohort 2 accounts for 43.4%. In both hypothesis tests, the nexus between *PEO* and *CLP* ambition is stronger than the link between *NotPEO* and *CLP* legislators.

Table #8: Linkage of Progressive (PEO) + Intra-institutional (CLP) Ambition as Percentage of Legislature

Linkage	Assembly	Senate	% Total
Not PEO/Not CLP	9.20%	3.30%	12.50%
Not PEO/CLP	19.20%	8.30%	27.50%
PEO/Not CLP	14.20%	10.00%	24.20%
PEO/CLP	24.20%	11.60%	35.80%
			100.00%

The hypothesis is also confirmed if the data are dis-aggregated by legislative chamber. Table #9 indicates that among the 46 Assembly members who held previous elective office (*PEO*), 29 also held a leadership position in the 244th Legislature, or 36.25% of the Assembly. In contrast, the *NotPEO* Assembly members who were also leaders in their chamber represent a smaller proportion of the Assembly (28.75%). The differential is again even larger when the *PEO* cohort of Assembly members is viewed separately. A fifteen percentage point differential exists between *PEO* Assembly members who had leadership positions and those who did not [*PEO/CLP* (36.25%) - *PEO/NotCLP* (21.25%)].

Table #9: Linkage of Progressive (PEO) + Intra-Institutional (CLP) Ambition as Percentage of Each Chamber

Linkage	Assem. #	Assem.%	Sen.	Sen. %
Not PEO/NotCLP	11	13.75%	4	10.00%
Not PEO/CLP	23	28.75%	10	25.00%
PEO/NotCLP	17	21.25%	12	30.00%
PEO/CLP	29	36.25%	14	35.00%

A similar pattern is evident in the Senate. Among the 26 *PEO* senators, 14 (or 35% of the Senate) held leadership positions while only 25% of that body was comprised of senators who were *NotPEO* senators but who occupied a leadership office. Unlike the Assembly, that differential narrows when *PEO* senators are analyzed alone. Only five percentage points separate *PEO* senators who held leadership

positions from those who did not, 35% and 30%, respectively. Reasons for the significant differential in the links between *PEO* and *CLP* ambition in the two chambers are addressed below.

Table #10: Distribution of PEO/CLP [LPC] Legislators by Chamber & Party ID

<u>Chamber</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%LPC</u>	<u>Dems.</u>	<u>%LPC</u>	<u>Reps.</u>	<u>%LPC</u>
Assembly	29	53.48%	14	32.55%	15	34.88%
Senate	14	46.51%	9	20.93%	5	11.62%
Total	43	99.99%	23	53.48%	20	46.50%

Table #11: PEO/CLP [LPC] Legislators as Percentage of Chamber by Party ID

<u>Chamber</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%Cham.</u>	<u>Dems.</u>	<u>%Cham.</u>	<u>Reps.</u>	<u>%Cham.</u>
Assembly	29	28.75%	14	17.50%	15	18.75%
Senate	14	50.00%	9	22.50%	5	12.50%
Total	43	99.99%	23	53.48%	20	46.50%

Tables #10 and #11 focus specifically on the distribution of the *LPC* cohort across both chambers of the Legislature (Table #10) and the *LPC* cohort as a percentage of each chamber by party identification (Table #11). The former table shows that two-thirds of the *LPC* cohort is concentrated in the Assembly, and Republicans account for a slightly larger share of that group. The Republican advantage does not apply to the Senate. In that chamber, *LPC* Democrats comprised a significantly higher proportion of *LPC* senators than Republicans, 20.93% and 11.62%, respectively. Table #11 represents the *LPC* cohort as a percentage of each chamber, by party identification. According to this metric, the partisan differential of Democrats, when the *PEO* and *CLP* variables were considered separately is reversed. *LPC* Republicans account for a slightly larger portion of the Assembly than *LPC* Democrats (18.75% and 17.50%, respectively).

Level Four: Progressive & Intra-institutional Ambition: (PAO+PSLP) +CLP [LPPC]

This particular level of ambition pertains specifically to members of the New Jersey Senate. The referent for *PAO* ambition is senators whose first elective office was outside the legislature and who also served in the Assembly; as noted earlier, *PSLP* ambition applies to senators who held leadership positions during their tenure in the Assembly; and legislators with *CLP* ambition held leadership positions at some point during their tenure in the Senate.

Twenty-six *PEO* senators held previous elective office before entering the legislature, 19 of which also served in the New Jersey Assembly (the *PAO* cohort). In terms of intra-institutional ambition, the 244th Legislature had 18 senators (45% of the upper chamber) who held leadership positions in the General Assembly before being elected to the Senate; this group constitutes the cohort of *PSLP* senators. The overlap between these two groups is comprised of 14 senators (Link-*PAO/PSLP* - the *LPP* cohort). Table #12 indicates the *LPP* cohort is evenly divided between Democrats and Republicans, thus the partisan advantage Democrats held in other types of political ambition is not evident in this particular cohort.

The nexus between progressive (*PAO*) and intra-institutional (*PSLP*) ambition can be evaluated from two vantage points. The first is to establish the proportion of *LPP* senators in each chamber by party identification. Table #12 shows that the partisan advantage Democrats held in terms of *PEO*, *PAO*, and *CLP* ambition is completely absent in the *LPP* cohort. Indeed, if any group of senators is predisposed, according to biographical markers, to embrace the ethos of bipartisanship it would be this particular cohort. Their commonality is that they more closely approximate the profile of career-

legislators, and they have an established record of intra-institutional leadership even before assuming their senatorial seats.

Table #12: Link-PAO/PSLP (LPP) Cohort by Party ID & Percentage of Senate

<u>Party ID</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%Senate</u>
Democrats	7	17.50%
Republicans	7	17.50%
Total	14	35.00%

The second vantage point is to determine the likelihood that members of the LPP cohort also held a leadership position in the Senate. This can be established by responding to the following question: *How likely are LPP senators to hold leadership positions in the Senate after having occupied a leadership office during their previous tenure in the Assembly?* The first step in responding to the question is to recall that 19 senators of the 244th Legislature also served in the Assembly. Almost three-fourths (14 or 73.7%) of that cohort also held leadership positions during their tenure in the Assembly (*PAO + PSLP*, i.e., the *LPP* cohort); and almost two-thirds of that cohort (9 or 64.3%) also held a leadership position in the Senate (*CLP*). Among the five *PAO* senators who did not hold a leadership position in the Assembly only 1 did so in the Senate. Thus, the odds that *LPP* senators also held leadership positions in the Senate are 2 out of 3. In contrast, only 1 in 5 *PAO* senators occupied a leadership position in the Senate if they did not hold such a position in the Assembly.

Thus, there are 9 senators who belong to the Link-*(PAO+PSLP) +CLP* (or, *LPPC*) cohort, or slightly more than one-fifth of the Senate (5 Democrats and 4 Republicans). This cohort of New Jersey state senators is a particularly ambitious minority of the Senate. They held previous elective office outside the state legislature,

served in the Assembly, occupied leadership positions therein, and also held a leadership position in Senate during the 244th Legislature. Senators who display both levels of progressive ambition (*PEO and PAO*) also have a clear propensity toward both levels of intra-institutional ambition (*CLP and PSLP*). The nexus between these two types of ambition is clearly evident within this particular cohort of senators. As noted earlier, Democrats held no partisan advantage in the *LPP* cohort, but they had a 2.5 percentage point in their favor among *LPPC* senators (Table #13).

Table #13: (PAO+PSLP) +CLP Legislators by Party ID & Percentage of Senate

<u>Party ID</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%LPPC</u>	<u>%Senate</u>
Democrats	5	55.55%	12.50%
Republicans	4	44.44%	10.00%
Total	9	99.99%	22.50%

The converse group (*NotPAO + NotCLP*) is too small for substantive comparisons; this cohort consists of only two senators. There are two other senators who are also *NotPAO* legislators, but they both held leadership positions in the Senate. Thus, there are only 4 (or, 10% of the Senate) members of the legislature's upper chamber who did not hold previous elective office either outside the Legislature or in the General Assembly. These political neophytes, however, are not altogether foreclosed from the opportunity to pursue intra-institutional ambition. As noted, two of those four senators held a leadership position in the 244th Legislature (only 5% of the Senate). However, this number is considerably smaller than the group of *LPPC* senators (9, or 22.5% of the Senate).

In contrast to the General Assembly, the Senate is largely comprised of seasoned career-legislators with previous electoral experience. Fully 90% of all

senators started their electoral careers outside the legislature and/or in the General Assembly. In the lower chamber 42.50% of its membership had no previous elective experience. As noted above with the 4 senators who had no previous electoral experience, leadership opportunities are not foreclosed to political neophytes - 2 of those four senators held leadership positions. In the Assembly, slightly more than two-thirds (67.65%) of the 34 legislators with no previous electoral experience also secured a leadership position. However, the proper framework for comparative analysis is to express the linkage between previous electoral experience and leadership as a proportion of the two respective chambers. As noted previously, the likelihood of holding a leadership position in either chamber increases if a legislator had previous electoral experience.

Level Five: Progressive Ambition (SHO) and Bounded Ambition (RVS & LOS)

Another discernible level of progressive ambition from the biographical profiles of legislators is the active pursuit of a higher office by members of the 244th Legislature. Interested citizens who peruse official and partisan websites, as well as the www.votesmart.org site, can learn which legislators have campaigned (unsuccessfully) for statewide office or a seat in Congress. This third form of progressive ambition (*SHO* - *Sought Higher Office*) is attributed to a cohort of 13 members of the New Jersey Legislature. The second category analyzed in this section is what is coined herein as "bounded ambition," which is not in itself a type of ambition like progressive or intra-institutional ambition. Rather, it refers to the mediating effects on political ambition from two internal features of the Legislature. The first (*RVS* - *Recruited Vacant Seat*) is the

system of recruitment both parties utilize to fill vacant seats in the legislature. The second feature of bounded ambition is termed herein as "Leadership Opportunity Structures" (*LOS*).

While the number of *SHO* legislators is relatively small (13, or just 10.8% of all legislators), almost one-third of the legislature (36, or 30%) is comprised of members for whom political ambition is mediated by *RVS*. The aim of the discussion on leadership opportunity structures (*LOS*) is not to identify a cohort of legislators with a specific attribute in common. Instead, it is to highlight how intra-institutional ambition and its link with progressive ambition are affected by the relative degree of opportunities for leadership in the General Assembly and the Senate.

Table #14: Distribution of SHO Legislators by Chamber & PartyID

<u>Chamber</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%SHO</u>	<u>Dems.</u>	<u>%SHO</u>	<u>Reps.</u>	<u>%SHO.</u>
Assembly	8	61.53%	4	30.76%	4	30.76%
Senate	5	38.36%	2	15.38%	3	23.07%
Total	13	99.99%	6	46.14%	7	53.83%

Table #15: SHO Legislators as Percentage of Chamber by Party ID

<u>Chamber</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%Cham.</u>	<u>Dems.</u>	<u>%Cham.</u>	<u>Reps.</u>	<u>%Cham.</u>
Assembly	8	10.00%	4	5.00%	4	5.00%
Senate	5	12.50%	2	5.00%	3	7.50%
Total	13	99.99%	6		7	

Table #14 shows that the *SHO* cohort consists of 5 senators and 8 members of the Assembly (6 Democrats and 7 Republicans). A slight majority of the *SHO* cohort (7 of 13) consists of *PEO* legislators; their first elective office was outside the New Jersey Legislature. There are seven members of the same cohort that also held leadership

positions in their respective chambers (*Current Leadership Position* [or *CLP*] ambition). All five of the *SHO* senators also served in the General Assembly; thus, a precise correlation exists between *PAO* and *SHO* ambition for the senatorial members of this cohort. The single most distinguishing feature of all 13 members of the *SHO* cohort is that none also belong to the *RVS* cohort. All the members of this group achieved their legislative office without being recruited by their party organization. Though the sample is small, this finding suggests that legislators may feel more willing to leave the legislature for higher office if they do not owe, in part, their legislative position to the recruitment efforts of their own political party.

The advantage Democrats held with other types of progressive ambition is not replicated for *SHO* ambition. Indeed, in the Assembly the percentage of *SHO* legislators is the same for both parties (5%), whereas in the Senate, Republicans actually have a +2.5 percentage point advantage over Democrats (Table #15). The minority status of the Republican Party and the more limited range of leadership opportunities in the Senate, as opposed to the Assembly, may encourage more Republicans to be less risk-averse than Democrats in deciding to leave the Senate and seek higher office (Berkman and Eisenstein, 1999).

The *RVS* cohort is almost three times as large as the group of *SHO* legislators. The former consists of 36 legislators; 24 members of the Assembly and 12 senators. Slightly more than half of the cohort (55.5%) exhibit both *PEO* and *CLP* ambition. Thus, the partisan system of recruitment for vacant legislative seats produces a *RVS* cohort in which a slight, though not overwhelming, majority of its members overlap with the Link-*PEO/CLP (LPC)* cohort. All but two of the 12 *RVS* senators also served in the General

Assembly and 8 of those 10 legislators held leadership positions therein (*PSLP* ambition). It is not surprising that party organizations have a keen interest in recruiting prospective senators (for vacant seats) who served in the General Assembly and held leadership positions therein during their tenure. Thus, while the link between progressive and intra-institutional ambition is true for a majority of *RVS* legislators, the link is even more pronounced for *RVS* senators. This finding is consistent with political science research in which previous elective and leadership experiences are important markers of the "quality" of a prospective candidate for a vacant seat (Berkman and Eisenstein, 1999). Members of the LPP cohort would therefore be especially appealing to party organizations seeking to fill a vacant senate seat.

Table #16: Distribution of RVS Legislators by Chamber & Party ID

<u>Chamber</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%RVS</u>	<u>Dems.</u>	<u>%RVS</u>	<u>Reps.</u>	<u>%RVS.</u>
Assembly	24	66.66%	12	33.33%	12	33.33%
Senate	12	39.33%	8	22.22%	4	11.11%
Total	36	99.99%	20	55.55%	16	44.44%

Table #17: RVS Legislators as Percentage of Chamber by Party ID

<u>Chamber</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%Cham.</u>	<u>Dems.</u>	<u>%Cham.</u>	<u>Reps.</u>	<u>%Cham.</u>
Assembly	24	30.00%	12	15.00%	12	15.00%
Senate	12	30.00%	8	20.00%	4	10.00%
Total	36	99.99%	20		16	

Table #16 indicates that two-thirds of the *RVS* cohort is clustered in the Assembly where the partisan differential is zero; the *RVS* cohort in the Senate is comprised of 8 Democrats and 4 Republicans. While 1 in 5 Democratic senators in the 244th Legislature belonged to the *RVS* only 10% of Republicans did so (Table #17).

The percentage point differential favors Democrats in the Senate (10 points) but the two

parties have parity in the Assembly. That no overlap exists between *SHO* legislators and the *RVS* cohort suggests the possibility that the latter group may have a heightened sense of fealty to the legislative body to which they were recruited, and may therefore be less inclined to seek higher office.

The other dimension of bounded ambition is what is herein termed as the "Leadership Opportunity Structures" (*LOS*) of the two chambers. The *LOS* concept is a variation of what scholars of social movement mobilization refer to as "political opportunity structures" (*POS*). Social scientists typically utilize the latter to explain why certain social movements are able to mobilize successfully while others are not. The underlying point is that the strategic choices pursued by social movements are often mediated by the broader institutional context in which mobilization occurs. Relatively open political systems tend to engender strategies of accommodationist politics among reformists, whereas confrontational politics may be the only viable strategic path for social movement mobilization in a closed polity (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004).^v The analogical connection between political opportunity structures (*POS*) and *LOS* is that the factors that contribute to strategic behavior are not simply endogenous. In both concepts, the exogenous factors of the broader institutional context can significantly influence the strategic choices of both social movements (*POS*) and, in the case of the present study, the pursuit of political ambition by legislators (*LOS*).

The institutional context that affects the strategies legislators pursue to develop their political ambitions is the breadth of leadership opportunities within the two chambers of the New Jersey Legislature. The range of *LOS* is reflected in the leadership positions that accrue to the majority and minority parties in the New Jersey

Legislature. The General Assembly has twice as many members as the Senate, and correspondingly, there are significantly more opportunities for leadership development in the former than in the latter. Moreover, because the majority party in both chambers is Democratic (58.75% of the Assembly and 60% of the Senate) more possibilities for melding progressive and intra-institutional ambition are afforded to Democrats than Republicans. Thirty-seven members of the General Assembly hold leadership positions. The Democratic majority holds 22 (or 59.5%) of those positions, a proportion that closely mirrors their percentage in the Assembly (58.75%). The majority has 11 offices, but two are shared by several members, i.e., there are 8 Deputy Speakers and 5 Deputy Majority Leaders. The Republican minority in the Assembly also holds 11 offices, three of which are held by multiple legislators, i.e., 3 Deputy Minority Leaders, 2 Assistant Minority Whips, and 2 Minority Policy Co-chairs (for a total of 15 Republican leadership positions). The Senate has only 12 leadership offices, divided equally between the Democratic Majority and the Republican Minority. However, two senators are Assistant Majority Leaders. Thus, there are 13 senators who hold leadership positions in the Senate, compared to 37 in the General Assembly.

The asymmetry in *LOS* between New Jersey's two legislative chambers is also reflected in the committee system. The opportunities for intra-institutional leadership in the two chambers are substantial, through membership on the Standing Reference Committees, Standing Administrative Committees, and the Standing Joint Committees of the two chambers. The Assembly has a total of 29 committees in these three categories (Reference-23, Administrative-1, and Joint-5) whereas the Senate has 21 (Reference-13, Administrative-3, and Joint-5) (Fitzgerald Manual, 2011).

LOS in both chambers of the Legislature provides legislators several avenues to forge strong linkages between their propensities for both progressive and intra-institutional ambition. The broader range of *LOS* that accrues to the majority party means that Democrats should enjoy a partisan advantage. That was certainly the case with *PEO* and *CLP* ambition in both chambers of the Legislature. However, the preceding analyses have shown that there was no Democratic advantage in the following types of political ambition (*SHO*-Assembly & Senate; *PSLP*-Senate; *LPC*-Assembly; *LPP*-Senate and *RVS*-Assembly). The reason the partisan advantage for the Democrats does not hold across all levels of political ambition is that the differentials in Table #18 are not for all Democrats and Republicans. The differentials apply to a specific type of legislator - i.e., the most ambitious in the Legislature. The three linkages analyzed in this section (i.e., *LPC*, *LPP*, and *LPPC*) represent only those legislators who embody both progressive and intra-institutional ambition. The *LPC* linkage (Link-*PEO*+*CLP* contains two data points, the Assembly and Senate); Assembly Republicans held a 1.25 percentage point advantage in the 244th Legislature but Democrats had a substantial (10 point) advantage in the Senate. The *LPP* linkage (Link-*PAO*+*PSLP*) for the Senate showed no partisan advantage for either party, and Democrats held a small 2.5 percentage point advantage in the *LPPC* linkage (Link-*(PAO*+*PSLP)* +*CLP*). While the partisan advantage that accrues to the majority party is still evident in these three linkages, its importance is diminished in relation to the clear advantage Democrats held in the underlying categories of ambition when they are considered individually (*PEO* and *CLP*).

Implications

The analyses in Levels One through Five highlight multiple dimensions of the nexus between legislative biography and the varieties of political ambition outlined below. The study posited three variations of the concept of progressive ambition:

- 1) Previous Elective Office - *PEO*,
- 2) Previous Assembly Office - *PAO*,
- 3) Sought Higher Office - *SHO*;

Distinguished between two types of intra-institutional ambition:

- 4) Current Leadership Position - *CLP*,
- 5) Pre-Senate Leadership Position - *PSLP*; and

Coined a third type of political ambition (Bounded Ambition) with four referents:

- 6) Recruited Vacant Seat - *RVS*;
- 7) Link *PEO+CLP* - *LPC*;
- 8) Link *PAO+PSLP* - *LPP*; and
- 9) Link (*PAO+PSLP*) + *CLP* - *LPPC*.

Table #18 indicates that these 9 variables yield 14 data points because four apply exclusively to the Senate (*PAO*, *PSLP*, *LPP*, and *LPPC*). The first level of analysis posed the question whether the partisan differential that favors Democrats in terms of *PEO* ambition would extend to the other varieties of political ambition. Table #18 shows that the partisan advantage for Democrats holds in 8 of the 14 data points. In four data points (*SHO*-Assembly, *PSLP*-Senate, *RVS*-Assembly, and *LPP*-Senate) there is parity between the two parties, and the partisan differential favors Republicans in two instances (*SHO*-Senate and *LPC*-Assembly).

Table #18: Differentials Favoring Democrats by Category of Ambition

<u>Political Ambition</u>	<u>Assembly</u>	<u>Senate</u>
1) PEO	7.5	10.0
2) PAO	N/A	2.5
3) SHO	0.0	-2.5
4) CLP	5.0	15.0
5) PSLP	N/A	0.0
6) RVS	0.0	10.0
7) LPC	-1.25	10.0
8) LPP	N/A	0.0
9) LPPC	N/A	2.5

The biographic data on the first type of progressive ambition (*Previous Elective Office - PEO*) suggest that the New Jersey Legislature has a large proportion (60%, or 72 legislators) of public servants who held public office, primarily in local government, prior to winning their legislative seats. Slightly less than two-thirds (63.9%) of the *PEO* cohort is in the Assembly and slightly more than one-third (36.1%) is in the Senate. That substantial difference is attributable to the relative size of the two chambers. If the cohort is expressed as a percentage of the two chambers, however, a higher proportion of the Senate (65%) comprises the *PEO* cohort than is the case for the Assembly (57.50%). Further dis-aggregating the data by party identification reveals that the percentage point differential favors Democrats in both chambers by 7.5 points in the Assembly and 10 points in the Senate (Table #18). *PEO* Democrats represent 32.50% of the Assembly while *PEO* Republicans constitute 25%; in the Senate *PEO* Democrats comprise 37.50% of its membership while Republicans constitute 27.50% of that body. The larger differential in the Senate means that the chamber holds particular appeal to legislators who began their political careers before joining the New Jersey Legislature.

The observation that progressive ambition characterizes a sizable proportion of the Senate is reinforced by the *PAO (Previous Assembly Office)* data. Almost half of the Senate (47.50% or 19) also served in the General Assembly. That cohort is almost evenly divided between Democrats (10) and Republicans (9). The partisan differential for *PAO* ambition also favors Senate Democrats, but the advantage is only 2.5 percentage points (Table #18), a significantly smaller advantage than the *PEO* differential of 10 points in favor of Senate Democrats. Thus, the third implication of the study is that with successive levels of progressive (*PEO* to *PAO*) ambition the importance of party identification diminishes. This is particularly evident by comparing the partisan differential (in percentage points) between *PEO* and *PAO* cohorts. The differential favors Senate Democrats by 10 percentage points in the former cohort, but only by 2.5 points in the latter. To reiterate, members of the *PAO* cohort were first elected to public office outside the legislature and also served in the General Assembly before being elected to the Senate.

Dis-aggregating data by legislative chamber, as opposed to focusing solely on the entire legislature, has real analytic value, particularly when progressive ambition is correlated with another variable like legislative professionalization. At the outset of the study a correlation was established between the user-friendliness of official/partisan websites (the R1-OW and R2-OPW scores) and legislative professionalization among the 50 state legislatures in the United States. A similar correlation may also exist between the first two types of progressive ambition (*PEO* & *PAO*) and legislative professionalization. The prevalence of *PEO* and *PAO* legislators is not the causal factor for New Jersey's designation as one of the 10 most professionalized (MP) legislatures.

However, a correlation is certainly plausible if the MP designation provides an additional incentive for career-public servants to pursue a higher electoral office in the General Assembly, and especially in the Senate. If further research can establish a correlation between progressive ambition and legislative professionalization, the analysis should focus not just on the legislature as a whole but on the upper and lower chambers as well. An even more nuanced approach would be to analyze how various sub-groups of each chamber embrace the values, norms, and ethos of legislative professionalization. If partisan advantage diminishes particularly among *PAO* senators, an interesting point of inquiry would be to establish whether a spirit of bi-partisanship is stronger among *PAO* senators than is true for their non-*PAO* colleagues.

The scholarship on legislative professionalization does not include previous elective office, previous service in a lower chamber, or an ethos of bi-partisanship among its criteria. Thus, the fourth implication of the present study is that *PEO* and *PAO* ambition should be considered factors that contribute to a legislature's professionalization. An area for further research is to establish whether these categories of ambition correlate positively with higher levels of the broader definition of legislative professionalization proposed herein. The hypothesis for further testing is: *Does progressive ambition (especially PEO and PAO ambition) increase with higher levels of legislative professionalization?* Confirmation of the hypothesis means that citizen-legislators are more common in the less professionalized legislatures and career-politicians are more typical in more professionalized chambers.

Additionally, confirmation would reinforce the point that the conventional understanding of legislative professionalization should be broadened. The defining

characteristics of legislative professionalism would thereby not be limited to the amount of work-time, compensation, and resources that attach to legislative offices. Instead, scholars would also consider whether legislators perceive their electoral careers as ongoing (career-legislators) - as opposed to episodic (citizen-legislators) expressions of their civic duty. Legislators with the careerist orientation to public service, especially those with *PEO* and *PAO* ambition, may be more inclined to value the norms, mores, and ethos of professionalization (including a spirit of bi-partisanship) during their legislative tenure.

New Jersey's professionalized legislature attracts career politicians who not only have previous electoral experience (*Previous Elective Office-PEO* and *Previous Assembly Office-PAO*) but who also exhibit intra-institutional ambition (*Current Leadership Position-CLP* and *Pre-Senate Leadership Position-PSLP*). The study constructed three sets of variables to express and analyze these linkages. The first is Link-*PEO+CLP (LPC)*; the second is Link-*PAO+PSLP (LPP)*, and the third is Link-*(PAO+PSLP) +CLP (LPPC)*.

The first link (*LPC*) refers to legislators who had previous elective experience before joining the New Jersey Legislature and who held a leadership position in the 244th Legislature. The analysis in Section Six determined that legislators with previous electoral experience (outside the legislature) were more likely to hold a leadership position than legislators who no previous elective experience. That pattern held for the legislature as a whole and the upper and lower chambers as well. In terms of partisan differentials the two underlying variables (*PEO* and *CLP*), when viewed separately, evidenced a decided advantage for Democrats in both chambers. Moreover, the

percentage point differential is greater - in favor of Democrats - in the Senate (*PEO*-10 points; *CLP*-15 points) than in General Assembly (*PEO*-7.5 points; *CLP*-5 points). The advantage for Democrats is unsurprising given its status as the majority party in both chambers.

However, when the *PEO* and *CLP* cohorts are merged into the *LPC* cohort and includes only legislators with both types of ambition, the differential no longer favors Democrats in the Assembly. During the 244th Legislature Republicans held a 1.25 percentage point advantage in the lower chamber while Democrats held a 10 point advantage in the Senate. A plausible reason for the shift in partisan advantage from the Democrats to the Republicans in the Assembly, but not in the Senate, is the manner in which "Leadership Opportunity Structures" (*LOS*) create opportunities for legislators to pursue intra-institutional ambition.

The second linkage is Link-PAO+PSLP (*LPP*) and applies exclusively to the Senate. The *LPP* cohort consists of senators who started their electoral career outside the Legislature, served in the General Assembly, and occupied a leadership position therein. This particular cohort consists of 14 senators, which represents slightly more than one-third of the chamber and is evenly divided between Democrats and Republicans. The narrative in Section Six hypothesized that this cohort of senators may be particularly predisposed toward bipartisanship because of the salient commonalities in their biographical profiles. The cohort comprises a sizable portion of the Senate (35%). The N-sample is sufficiently large enough to conduct a series of analyses with descriptive and inferential statistics. Progressive and intra-institutional ambition may correlate well with higher levels of legislative professionalization. If so, senators who

exhibit both forms of ambition may be even more predisposed toward the norms, values, and spirit of bipartisanship of legislative professionalism than legislators who exhibit only progressive or intra-institutional ambition. The analyses can be replicated with the smaller *LPPC* cohort to establish whether additional levels of intra-institutional ambition further increase a legislator's predisposition toward legislative professionalism. Thus, the fifth implication of the study is that senators with a strong orientation toward both levels of progressive ambition (*PEO* + *PAO*) and both types of intra-institutional ambition (*CLP* + *PSLP*) may be the best exemplars of the broader view of legislative professionalization advanced in the study.

The third link (Link-(*PAO*+*PSLP*)+*CLP* [the *LPPC* cohort]) applies as well to the Senate and refers to senators who were first elected outside the Legislature, served in the General Assembly, held a leadership position therein, and also occupied a leadership post in the Senate. Within the framework of political ambition, as defined in the study, the *LPPC* cohort represents the most ambitious group of New Jersey legislators. The cohort exhibits more varieties of political ambition than other cohorts analyzed in the study (i.e., *PEO*, *PAO*, *PSLP*, and *CLP* ambition). The cohort is relatively small; slightly more than 1 in 5 senators belong to it and Democrats have a slight partisan advantage (2.5 percentage points). The sixth implication of the study is that the varieties of political ambition are not distributed evenly across the legislature, or even across the two chambers. There are clusters of legislators that embody more dimensions of political ambition than other groups. If the hypothesized connection between progressive ambition and legislative professionalization has empirical validity, then further research should focus on intra-chamber cohorts and measure how their

political ambition contributes to the overall level of professionalization in their respective legislatures. The findings of this study suggest that legislators, particularly senators, with more varieties of political ambition may be the most favorably predisposed toward legislative professionalism.

New Jersey state senators have served, on average, more years in the legislature than their counterparts in the Assembly, 9.5 years and 7.6 years, respectively. Longer service in the upper legislative chamber, coupled with a previous electoral tenure outside the legislature, may suggest that as state senators satiate their ambition for progressively higher office, their political ambition becomes defined not just in terms of winning elections but also in terms of developing a reputation for intra-institutional leadership. This possibility is quite consistent with Richard Fenno's study of the U.S. Senate in which senators with longer tenure in office also sought to enhance their political legacies through intra-institutional leadership (Fenno, 1996). In the case of the New Jersey Senate, members who are therefore more predisposed toward progressive ambition also exhibit a stronger propensity for intra-institutional ambition. The same is true for the Assembly, but it is especially pronounced in the Senate.

In addition to years of service, two other intervening variables to consider are what the study refers to as bounded ambition, i.e., whether legislators were recruited to fill vacant seats (*RVS*) and the scope of leadership opportunities (*LOS*) in the Legislature. The seventh implication of the study is that the prevalence of *RVS* legislators suggests that this cohort may well be a source of institutional fealty to the legislature to which they were recruited. The manifestation of such an attitude may be a reluctance to pursue *SHO* ambition and to have a stronger inclination to embrace the

values, norms, mores, and spirit of bipartisanship of legislative professionalism. An interesting point of inquiry is whether the *RVS* legislators have a stronger predisposition toward legislative professionalism than legislators who comprise the *LPC*, *LPP*, and *LPPC* cohorts.

As noted, the leadership opportunity structures of a legislature do not constitute a distinct cohort of legislators; rather, they represent the institutional loci where legislators meld their progressive and intra-institutional ambitions. Thus, the final implication of the study is that if further research establishes that the varieties of political ambition correlate with legislative professionalism, an important predicate to that analysis is the scope of leadership opportunity structures in a legislature, particularly if higher levels of legislative professionalization provide incentives for legislators to pursue both progressive and intra-institutional ambition (Maestas, 2000).

Section Seven: Implications & Recommendations

The study identified eight implications from the preceding analyses. To reiterate, they are:

- 1) The quality and ease of the online experience, for citizens interested in constructing biographical profiles of legislators, will generally improve as the level of legislative professionalism increases.
- 2) Higher levels of legislative professionalization may attract prospective officeholders with the sort of biographical profiles that give the New Jersey Legislature high national rankings in certain demographic characteristics.
- 3) Successive levels of progressive (*PEO-Previous Elective Office* to *PAO-Previous Assembly Office*) ambition diminish the importance of party identification among members of the respective legislative cohorts.
- 4) *PEO* and *PAO* ambition should be considered factors that contribute to a legislature's professionalization.

5) Senators with a strong orientation toward both levels of progressive ambition (*PEO + PAO*) and both types of intra-institutional ambition (*CLP-Current Leadership Position + PSLP-Pre-Senate Leadership Position*) may be the best exemplars of the broader view of legislative professionalization advanced in the study.

6) Varieties of political ambition are not distributed evenly across the legislature, or even across the two chambers. There are clusters (or cohorts) of legislators that embody more dimensions of political ambition than other groups.

7) The prevalence of *RVS-(Recruited Vacant Seat)* legislators suggests that this cohort may well be a source of institutional fealty to the Legislature to which they were recruited and may well be favorably predisposed to legislative professionalism.

8) If further research establishes that the varieties of political ambition correlate with legislative professionalism, an important predicate to that analysis is properly ascertaining the scope of leadership opportunity structures in a legislature.

The study's findings can provide scholars of legislative politics a template for establishing an ongoing research project on legislative biographies (e.g. The Legislative Biographies Project). Databases of legislative profiles can be constructed and supplemented with data from each successive legislature to provide a longitudinal study of the linkages between legislative biographies, political ambition, and legislative professionalization. Further research can test the empirical validity of the hypotheses proposed in this study. Additionally, such a project can include periodic updates to the public, in the form of an electronic newsletter for example, on the various biographical and demographic categories and varieties of political ambition that are the subject of this study. The database can also serve as a source of comparative analyses to evaluate how one state fares regionally and/or nationally in terms of the linkages between legislative biographies, political ambition, and legislative professionalism.

Endnotes

ⁱ http://books.google.com/books?id=KOGJAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=twopage&q&f=false. Accessed 7/25/2013.

ⁱⁱ <http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/legislatures/full-and-part-time-legislatures.aspx>. Accessed 7/24/2013.

ⁱⁱⁱ http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fast_facts/levels_of_office/Congress-CurrentFacts.php. Accessed 7/26/2013.

^{iv} <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/34000.html>. Accessed 7/26/2013.

^v See also, “Political Opportunity Structures” from the International Encyclopedia of Environmental Politics (http://books.google.com/books?id=hSE9jg_N4-IC&pg=PA375&lpg=PA375&dq=political+opportunity+structures+international+encyclopedia+of+environmental+politics&source=bl&ots=ZvEhPcez6K&sig=kblDnRkmfTz2ubpZuNCDKu bp4E&hl=en&sa=X&ei=DifyUaWiL4_Y9QSijYCABg&ved=0CDIQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=political%20opportunity%20structures%20international%20encyclopedia%20of%20environmental%20politics&f=false). Accessed 7/26/13.

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Appendix A

STATES	R1-OW	R2-OPW	Leg.Prof.Rate
Alabama	2	2	AP
Alaska	2	2	AP
Arizona	4	4	AP
Arkansas	3	4	AP
Colorado	1	2	AP
Connecticut	2	3	AP
Delaware	1	1	AP
Hawaii	2	2	AP
Iowa	1	1	AP
Kentucky	2	2	AP
Louisiana	2	2	AP
Maryland	2	2	AP
Minnesota	2	2	AP
Missouri	3	3	AP
Nebraska	2	2	AP
North Carolina	2	2	AP
Oklahoma	2	2	AP
Oregon	2	2	AP
South Carolina	2	2	AP
Tennessee	2	3	AP
Texas	3	3	AP
Virginia	2	3	AP
Washington	3	3	AP
Georgia	2	3	LP
Idaho	2	2	LP
Indiana	3	5	LP
Kansas	1	2	LP
Maine	2	3	LP
Mississippi	2	2	LP
Montana	1	1	LP
Nevada	2	2	LP
New Hampshire	3	3	LP
New Mexico	1	2	LP
North Dakota	2	2	LP
Rhode Island	3	4	LP
South Dakota	1	2	LP
Utah	2	2	LP
Vermont	1	1	LP
West Virginia	2	2	LP
Wyoming	2	2	LP
California	4	5	MP
Florida	2	2	MP
Illinois	2	3	MP
Massachusetts	2	2	MP
Michigan	3	4	MP
New Jersey	2	3	MP
New York	4	5	MP

Ohio	3	4	MP
Pennsylvania	2	3	MP
Wisconsin	3	3	MP
	2.16	2.56	